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This study systematically examines the practice of treaty shopping in international investment law and related arbitral awards. In this 
context the term "treaty shopping" connotes a strategic change of the investor's nationality for the purpose of accessing more 
favourable investment treaty provisions and dispute settlement mechanisms. The focus is solely on corporate investors, as the 
overwhelming majority of international investments are made by legal entities. In addition, the nationality of legal entities is generally 
much easier to manipulate as they can be relatively freely established, modified and dissolved.  
 
In recent years, international investment law has witnessed a rapidly growing number of treaty shopping cases, which has also 
raised certain concerns regarding the practice. At present, these concerns are strikingly unsettled as investment tribunals have 
adopted diverging attitudes towards treaty shopping, thus rendering decisions inconsistent with regard to the permissibility of it. 
Corporate nationality planning or treaty shopping is not illegal or unethical in principle, although many states perceive it as 
undesirable and have increasingly taken measures against such practices. What separates legitimate nationality planning from 
treaty abuse? The uncertainty about the limits of treaty shopping is unsatisfactory for both states and investors, not to mention the 
functionality of the investment protection system in general. This is the principal problem this study attempts to resolve. 
 
The study approaches the topic through three separate research questions. The first question seeks to place investment treaty 
shopping in the wider context. In this regard, the study will endeavour to establish a working definition of treaty shopping. In 
addition, the study will analyse the reasons for the occurrence of treaty shopping and introduce the most common ways to carry it 
out. Most importantly, the study explores in detail the benefits of treaty shopping and the main objections against it. Following the 
examination, the study concludes that despite extensive criticism, treaty shopping may actually enhance the underlying objectives of 
the investment regime: fair treatment of investors regardless their origin and helping states attract foreign capital to further stimulate 
financial growth. 
 
The second research question encompasses the legal limits to treaty shopping via corporate restructuring. The main purpose is to 
clarify the dividing line between legitimate nationality planning and abusive treaty shopping. To answer this question, the study 
analyses the most influential case law related to treaty shopping and discusses the different ways investment tribunals have 
reviewed the distinction between objectionable and acceptable treaty shopping. Further, the study attempts to systematise the main 
elements of the arbitral decisions with the goal of formulating general rules for assessing the permissibility of treaty shopping. These 
rules are useful guidelines for maintaining stability and predictability in investment treaty arbitration, which benefits both investors 
and states wishing to attract foreign capital. In this respect, the study suggests that the decisive factor is the timing of the investment 
vis-à-vis the timing of the dispute. The timing element, however, raises its own questions, each of which are further explained in the 
study. 
 
The third and final research question addresses the practical aspects of treaty shopping. While the previous research questions 
relate to defining the boundaries of treaty shopping, this part of the study focuses solely on the pragmatic and political implications.  
To this end, the study will introduce certain state reactions to treaty shopping. Further, the study will explore solutions and make 
recommendations de lege ferenda on how states can safeguard themselves against abusive treaty shopping. It also highlights that 
the power to curb the practice lies mostly with states who conclude investment treaties. The study suggests that the most effective 
methods are including narrower definitions and denial of benefits clauses to the treaties. From the foreign investor's perspective, the 
study will propose a "shopping list" that contains points to consider before undertaking any restructuring measures.  
 
This study is not meant as a comprehensive empirical review of treaty shopping, nor does it claim to supply any definitive answers 
to the questions it raises. Rather, the goal is to elaborate the legal issues arising from the ambiguous boundaries of treaty shopping 
and to make proposals as to how to assess these issues. For the time being, treaty shopping will remain not only possible, but also 
a highly attractive option for a prudent investor wishing to improve investment protection. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Policy Perspectives  
The world today is more integrated than ever before in the field of international investment 
and trade. Investment in particular has become an important tool in shaping the international 
economic landscape, and along with this development the significance of the international 
law and policy of foreign investment (hereafter FDI) has grown too. Capital no longer flows 
exclusively from developed countries towards the less developed but also vice versa. Inter-
governmental treaties establishing safeguards for the protection of aliens and their property 
abroad have a long history, but in the framework of international investment agreements 
(hereafter IIA) it was as late as in the second half of the 20th century when the number of 
IIAs grew exponentially.1  
Regardless of the fact that IIAs have been adopted almost universally, there is no global 
investment treaty or rule of customary international law that would obligate States to grant 
identical rights to investors irrespective of their country of origin. As a consequence, 
investors' legal stance relative to the State can vary. To obtain the most favourable 
investment protection in the patchwork of IIAs, a growing number of investors have resorted 
to treaty shopping, through which they restructure their business or investment in order to 
gain access to desirable treaty provisions and dispute settlement mechanisms, for which they 
would not be qualified otherwise.2 This practice is at the core of this Study. 
While treaty shopping is not a new phenomenon, it remains as controversial as ever.3 This 
practice has provoked debate on many levels; some find it perfectly acceptable, while others 
perceive it as exploitation and abuse of the investment protection system. For States, 
the stakes are high as they are on the respondent side of investment disputes. Have States 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Vandevelde Kenneth, 'A Brief History of International Investment Agreements' [2005] 12(1) UC 
Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157–194. According to United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) a total of 2951 bilateral investment treaties have been concluded as of the end 
of 2017, 2363 of which were in force. In addition to these, a total of 373 other types of treaties (for example 
free–trade agreements) contained investment provisions, 310 of them in force. See UNCTAD, 'International 
Investment Agreements Navigator' (Investment Policy Hub). 
Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA  (accessed 26 January 2018). 
2 The same practice is often times also called "nationality planning" but, for the sake of clarity, I will use the 
term treaty shopping throughout this Study. See more about the different definitions regarding treaty shopping 
in Subsection 3.6.1. 
3 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., 'Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the European Union' C. H. Panay (co-
author) in Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics (IBDF 2010) 21. 
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truly signed up for the consequences treaty shopping entails? They certainly seem 
dissatisfied.4  
The question of whether or not treaty shopping is permissible has reached arbitral tribunals 
on a few occasions. The case law has not clarified on the issue but, on the contrary, has 
created even more doubt regarding how to approach the treaty shopping phenomenon. 
Although arbitrators have expressed some discomfort towards the practice, in many cases 
they have approved treaty shopping based on the permissive wording of the relevant IIA. 
States have drafted the treaties and thus chosen to allow investors to shop in their jurisdiction. 
Meanwhile, a number of tribunals have employed teleological interpretations to resort to 
considerations beyond the treaty text. The outcomes of these cases have led to the emerging 
notion of abuse of process5 in the jurisprudence of investment treaty arbitration, which looks 
deeper into the true motives of changing nationalities to obtain treaty protection. This 
development of external standards has the potential to offer immediate relief by preventing 
the most questionable forms of treaty shopping.6 However, what separates legitimate 
nationality planning from mala fide restructuring? Should the tribunal stay within the limits 
of the treaty wording or does it have the authority to scrutinise the investor's intentions? A 
grey area remains. Timing of the restructuring seems to stand out as the decisive factor, but 
so far it remains unclear how it should be assessed. The uncertainty about the limits of treaty 
shopping is unsatisfactory for both States and investors – not to mention the functionality of 
the investment system in general. The combination of rather permissive terms of IIAs and 
the relatively low costs of incorporating a subsidiary abroad or moving to another 
jurisdiction is what enables some corporations to push the boundaries of legitimate 
                                                 
4 However, as Judge Schwebel, the former president of the ICJ, said: "Can it really be supposed that States of 
North and South, East and West, developed and developing, of virtually all political complexions and economic 
models, some 180 countries, have been misguided in concluding some 3,000 investment treaties?" Schwebel 
Stephen, 'Keynote Address: In Defence of Bilateral Investment Treaties' (International Council on 
Commercial Arbitration, 6 April 2014).  
Available at: http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/49810/iccamiamispeechfinalrendering.pdf  (accessed 9 April 
2018). 
5 Following the miscellaneous terminology of the case law, the terms "good faith" and "abuse of process" are 
used interchangeably in this Study. The doctrine of abuse of process is particularly tricky in the context of 
treaty shopping as it denotes to a conduct that is not prima facie illegal (it does not violate any established rule 
of procedure). Investors increasingly adopt creative litigation strategies, and hence identifying the true 
instances of abuse of process poses a significant challenge for arbitrators. Gaillard Emmanuel, 'Abuse of 
Process in International Arbitration' [2017] 32(1) ICSID Review 18. For recent commentary on abuse of 
process principle in international investment arbitration see De Brabandere Eric, '‘Good Faith’, ‘Abuse of 
Process’ and the Initiation of Investment Treaty Claims' [2012] 3(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 
609–636. 
6 Lee John, 'Resolving Concerns of Treaty Shopping in International Investment Arbitration' [2015] 5(2) 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 374–375 
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investment protection in the event of a dispute with a host State.7 While the treaty shopping 
phenomenon has definitely hit a nerve, is it really in contradiction with the primary 
objectives and fundamental nature of international investment law?  
1.2. Sources of Law 
International investment law, the framework of this Study, is a field of public international 
law. Primarily, investment law deals with the standards and rules governing commercial 
activities that multinational enterprises have undertaken in a foreign State.8 The international 
investment law regime is comprised of various legal sources such as an extensive network 
of IIAs, customary international law, general principles of law and the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals. Although these sources have many substantive similarities, there are also 
considerable differences, which make investment law a rather dynamic and challenging area 
of law. However, it also means that the regime governing international investment is highly 
fragmented, difficult to describe, and sometimes complicated to navigate. Investment law 
has also been characterised by instances of inconsistent law making and application. 
Moreover, it is in constant flux (which underlines the challenges).9 
The norms of investment law can be accepted under public international law only if they are 
based on an acknowledged source.10 The most authoritative and widely acknowledged 
source of international law is the recognised list of sources of general international law 
according to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereafter 
ICJ).11 Scholars typically focus on four main sources of international law: treaties, customary 
international law, general principles of law and juridical decisions. In the following, I will 
briefly introduce each of them in the context of investment law. 
                                                 
7 Gaillard Emmanuel, 'Abuse of Process in International Arbitration' [2017] 32(1) ICSID Review 19. 
8 Collins David, An Introduction to International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) 1. 
9 Sauvant Karl, The International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Challenges and Options, 
E15Initiative (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic 
Forum 2015) 9. 
10 Sornarajah Muthucumaraswamy, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 98. See also Koskenniemi Martti, The Sources of International Law (Ashgate/Dartmouth 2000). 
11 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, Annex to the Charter of the United Nations 26 
June 1945 (in force 25 October 1945). This reference was also made by the Executive Directors of the ICSID 
Convention. See ICSID, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965). The article states that the sources of international 
law include international conventions, international custom, and general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations, and as subsidiary sources, the judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists can be used. 
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One of the exceptional features of investment law is the major role of investment treaties 
(particularly bilateral ones) in investment relations; with regard to foreign investment, 
treaties are by far the most important source of law. Accordingly their provisions are, in most 
cases, the centrepiece of the law applied by investment tribunals.12 IIAs, however, can only 
cover investor-State relationships so far. They do not even aim to exhaustively define all 
possible aspects, but instead need to be supplemented with other sources of law.13  
In cases of lacunae, international customary law (such as the rules included in the 2001 ILC 
Articles on Responsibility of States) plays a significant role in complementing the treaty 
rules.14 Some IIAs may even explicitly refer to international customary law as a 
supplementary source of law. Even if a specific legal question is addressed by the provisions 
of the IIA in question, those provisions are frequently subject to divergent interpretations.15 
In such situations, investment tribunals must constantly interpreted the ambiguous language 
in light of international customary law.16 Further, general principles of law are also used to 
fill in the remaining gaps, although they are not considered as authoritative as treaties or 
custom.17 In the context of this Study, the general principle of good faith has great 
importance when evaluating the permissibility of treaty shopping practice.18  
Finally, it should be noted that even though there is no doctrine of precedent in international 
investment law and investment tribunals are not, in principle, bound by awards rendered by 
other tribunals, case law nevertheless has value. Investment tribunals have been inclined to 
follow previous rulings on the same subject matter (in somewhat similar circumstances) and 
                                                 
12 Grisel Florian, 'The Sources of Foreign Investment Law' in Douglas Zachary, Pauwelyn Joost and Viñuales 
Jorge E. (eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 217–219. The phenomenon of numerous IIAs is also called the "treatification" of 
investment law. See more in Salacuse Jeswald, 'The Treatification of International Investment 
Law' [2007] 13(1) Law and Business Review of the Americas 155–166. 
13 Newcombe Andrew and Paradell Lluís, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties Standards of 
Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009) 92. 
14 Hirsch Moshe, 'Sources of International Investment Law' in Bjorklund Andrea and Reinisch 
August (eds), International Investment Law and Soft Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2012) 16. 
15 Gazzini Tarcisio, 'The Role of Customary International Law in the Field of Foreign 
Investment' [2007] 8(5) The Journal of World Investment and Trade 710–712. 
16 See, for example, the Phoenix case (this case is analysed in greater detail in Subection 4.3.1): "It is evident 
to the Tribunal that the same holds true in international investment law and that the ICSID Convention’s 
jurisdictional requirements – as well as those of the BIT – cannot be read and interpreted in isolation from 
public international law, and its general principles. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/5, Award (15 April 2009) para 78. 
17 Lowe Vaughan, International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 87. See also Tolonen Hannu, 
Oikeuslähdeoppi (WSOY 2003) 134–137. 
18 Specifically its particularization, the abuse of process doctrine. See more how these principles have been 
applied by investment tribunals in Chapter 4. For a deeper analysis of the status of good faith principle in 
investment arbitration see Ponce José and Cevallos Ricardo, 'Good Faith in Investment 
Arbitration' [2016] 13(5) Transnational Dispute Management. 
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to develop a pattern of jurisprudence constant to enhance the predictability and stability of 
foreign investment.19 Therefore, de facto practice of precedent does exist in international 
investment law, and the majority of tribunals conscientiously examine earlier awards and 
accept their reasoning as authoritative in most cases.20 This tendency is also visible in the 
case law dealing with treaty shopping. However, despite the aspiration to coherence, the 
tribunals often reach divergent conclusions, which is also illustrated by the arbitral awards 
analysed in Chapter 4 of this Study. 
All the above mentioned sources of law are employed in this Study to properly characterise 
the treaty shopping phenomenon and assess its limits in light of the current case law. In 
addition, scholarly writings are an important source for organising and analysing the 
structure and content of treaty shopping. Domestic laws fall outside the scope of the research 
because, albeit relevant in many cases,21 they tend to differ greatly from country to country, 
particularly between different legal families and traditions. The aim of the Study is to provide 
an overall picture of treaty shopping practice in an international setting and, therefore, 
focusing too much on individual domestic legislation would lead to incomplete findings. 
1.3. Scope of the Study and Methodology  
The research questions of this Study revolve around one specific theme: the practice of treaty 
shopping in international investment law. My research focuses solely on the nationality 
changes of corporate investors because the overwhelming majority of international 
investments are made by legal entities rather than natural persons. In addition, the nationality 
                                                 
19 Bjorklund Andrea, 'Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante' in Picker Colin, Bunn 
Isabella, Arner Douglas (eds), International Economic Law The State and Future of the Discipline (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 265. See also the reasoning of the Impreglio tribunal: "Nevertheless, the Arbitral Tribunal 
finds it unfortunate if the assessment of these issues would in each case be dependent on the personal opinions 
of individual arbitrators. The best way to avoid such a result is to make the determination on the basis of case 
law whenever a clear case law can be discerned." (emphasis added). Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award (21 June 2011) para 108. 
20 Weiniger Matthew and Schreuer Christoph, 'A Doctrine of Precedent?' in Muchlinski, Ortino and 
Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 1188. 
21 For example, IIAs often include a requirement for covered investments to be made in accordance with the 
law of the host State, an obligation on States to admit investments in accordance with its laws and regulations, 
and a requirement that an expropriation has to be carried out in accordance with domestic legal procedures.  
Even when domestic law is not expressly mentioned in the IIA, it is still likely to play some kind of a role in 
the proceedings. In addition, the law of the place of arbitration is a relevant source of procedural law in non-
ICSID Convention cases. Finally, investors are subject to all of the laws and regulations of the host State. In 
this regard, corporate law, tax law, administrative law and practice, labour law, and numerous other areas of 
law will apply to the foreign investor and to the investment. UNCTAD, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement, A 
sequel' in UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (United Nations 
Publication 2014) 127–134. For further discussion see Hepburn Jarrod, Domestic Law in International 
Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2017). 
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of natural persons is generally much more difficult to manipulate for purposes of gaining 
access to a specific IIA whereas diversity of nationality is rather easy to achieve in the case 
of legal entities, as they are a creation of law and can be (relatively simply) established, 
modified and dissolved. 
I will approach the topic from different angles, through three separate research questions, 
each of which require slightly divergent usage of methodology. As a primary method 
throughout this research, I employ legal dogmatism from a practical point of view.22 That is, 
interpreting and systemising of formally valid legal rules, and weighing and balancing of 
international principles as well as other standards that enjoy adequate institutional support 
and societal approval.23 My aim is to clarify the jurisprudence related to investment treaty 
shopping, which is currently strikingly unsettled. The clarification is done by comprehensive 
and systematic examination of customary international law, international investment law and 
arbitral jurisprudence dealing with the practice of treaty shopping. Below, I will further 
elaborate on the structure of this Study, particularly each of the three research questions to 
be examined. 
To begin with, I lay the groundwork by introducing some basic concepts that are necessary 
to understand the thematics of treaty shopping. Chapter 2 describes the basic structure of 
international investment regime and depicts the vast extent of the global IIA network. 
Furthermore, it will explain the significance of investment dispute settlement mechanisms, 
which have had a great impact on the development of the treaty shopping phenomenon.  In 
this section of the Study, I interpret the rationale behind the evolution of the investment 
system as it is today, and analyse the benefits and shortcomings of the regime from a policy-
oriented perspective.24 
The first research question concerns the very essence of treaty shopping: what it is, how is 
it carried out and what are the reasons behind it. In Chapter 3, I will first establish a working 
definition for treaty shopping. Thereafter, I will examine the question as to what causes 
                                                 
22 Van Hoecke Mark, Title: Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of 
Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011) chapter 1, part III: Which Methodology for Legal Research.  
23 Siltala Raimo, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2003) 945–946. See also Aarnio 
Aulis, Reason and Authority, A Treatise on the Dynamic Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics (1997) 75 and Aarnio 
Aulis, 'Oikeussäännösten systematisointi ja tulkinta' in Häyhä Juha (ed), Minun metodini (Werner Söderström 
Lakitieto Oy 1997). 
24 Ratner Steven and Slaughter Anne-Marie, The Methods of International Law (The American Society of 
International Law 2004) 6 and McDougal Myres, 'Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach 
to Legal Study' [1956] Paper No. 2464 Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Series 53–72. 
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investors to treaty shop and illustrate the most common ways to do treaty shopping by the 
means of corporate restructuring. Furthermore, I will weigh the pros and cons of treaty 
shopping. I elaborate on the possible benefits of the treaty shopping practice mainly by 
viewing it through the lens of raison d’être25 of investment law, and explain why it has 
nevertheless gained such a controversial reputation. For this purpose I will discuss some of 
the central arguments against treaty shopping and analyse their plausibility in a critical 
manner. Finally, at the end of Chapter 3, I will shed light on the significance of the concept 
of nationality for treaty shopping. To describe the methodology for the first research 
question, I approach the issues on a conceptual level. That is, I explain the characteristics 
and the enabling factors of the phenomenon without evaluating its legitimacy. 
The second research question is more concrete, asking where the decisive line should be 
drawn. In other words, under which circumstances does treaty shopping turn from diligent 
corporate management into misuse of the investment system? In Chapter 4, I use various 
case studies to answer this question. First, I will describe the basic principles of treaty 
interpretation in international law, which provides useful guidance for the case analyses. The 
cases examined in this study are systematised in two main categories: literal and teleological 
interpretation of the treaty. The methodology of this part of the study represents a more 
traditional method of legal dogmatics that focuses on the evaluation and systematisation of 
rules and doctrines developed by the case law.26 I will interpret the ratio decedendi of the 
leading arbitral awards concerning treaty shopping and consequently formulate some general 
rules as to how the legality of treaty shopping should be evaluated. For the time being, the 
relevant legal praxis is strongly divided, which generates insecurity for both States and 
investors. However, certain common standards have emerged, and these can be used as 
guidelines when assessing future treaty shopping cases. 
The third and final research question addresses the practical aspects of treaty shopping. 
While the previous research questions relate to defining the boundaries of treaty shopping, 
Chapter 5 focuses solely on the pragmatic and political implications of it. In this part of the 
Study, I will examine the consequences of treaty shopping and the ways to control it: from 
both State's and investor's perspective. In Chapter 5, I will elaborate on State reactions to the 
treaty shopping phenomenon through two examples. Given that States give away part of 
                                                 
25 Reason for being; the sole or ultimate purpose of something. 
26 Aarnio Aulis, Oikeudellisen ajattelun perusteista (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 1971) 50 and Hirvonen 
Ari, Mitkä metodit? Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan (Yleisen oikeustieteen julkaisuja 2011) 25–26. 
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their sovereign power when they enter an investment treaty, the problematics of treaty 
shopping also often boil down to question of States' powers. That is why Chapter 5 will look 
to the future and asks what States can do to prevent investors from shopping into investment 
treaties which originally did not cover them. At this point, I will list ways to control treaty 
shopping. The purpose of this is not to take a normative position on whether States should 
adopt counter measures against treaty shopping or to what extent, rather, to analytically 
assess the challenges and opportunities afforded by various strategies that could be 
implemented by States who share negative perception of treaty shopping. With this regard, 
I will make recommendations on how States could make themselves less susceptible to the 
practice of treaty shopping.  
At the end of Chapter 5, I will review treaty shopping from investor's point of view and 
present a "shopping list" for foreign investors who are planning to engage in treaty shopping. 
With regards to the last part of the Study, my methodology focuses on de lege ferenda 
analysis and proposals considering also law and economics perspectives by reflecting the 
most efficient stance towards treaty shopping.27 However, it is impossible to deliver a 
definite solution regarding general acceptability of treaty shopping. As explained later in this 
Study, investors engage in treaty shopping for various reasons, in various manners and in 
circumstances. Thus, it would be impossible to provide a simple yes-or-no answer regarding 
the legitimacy of this practice. Finally, Chapter 6 recapitulates the main findings of the Study 
– is treaty shopping an enemy or an ally (if either) to investment law? And more importantly, 
where do we draw the line? 
The Study does not aim to be a comprehensive empirical review on treaty shopping nor does 
it claim to provide definitive answers to the questions it raises. Rather, the goal is to elaborate 
the main concerns about the practice of treaty shopping and, in this manner, encourage 
discussion of the phenomenon which, as I argue, requires clearer limits. 
 
 
                                                 
27 See Cooter Robert and Ulen Thomas, Law and Economics: Pearson New International Edition (Pearson 
Education 2013) Chapter 1: An Introduction to Law and Economics. 
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2. INVESTMENT TREATY PROTECTION  
Before beginning to analyse the research questions set out above, it is necessary to present 
the underlying characteristics of the international investment regime. In this Chapter, I will 
introduce the global system of investment agreement, focusing primarily on bilateral treaties 
(hereafter BIT). Then I will examine the purpose and rationale of the investment regime 
from the perspective of customary international law. In addition, I will present the 
characteristics of investor-State dispute settlement mechanism (hereafter ISDS) which is a 
unique feature of investment law. The aim of this Chapter is to provide the framework in 
which treaty shopping appears in order to fully analyse the phenomenon. 
2.1. Global Reach of Investment Agreements 
The development of the investment regime we know today has been eventful and driven by 
many factors. This Section contains a brief overview of the evolution of IIAs into a world-
wide BIT network. Understanding the historical background is essential to evaluate the 
phenomenon of treaty shopping, why it occurs and what one should make of it. 
The proliferation of treaties concluded to protect and liberalise foreign investment is said to 
be one of the most significant phenomena in international law during the past few decades.28 
The year 1959 is commonly acknowledged as the year when the first modern BIT was signed 
between Germany and Pakistan.29 Since then, other States have followed suit, and the 
number of BITs climbed steadily for some 30 years until around 1990, after which the figures 
began to increase exponentially.30 Today, almost every country in the world has signed at 
                                                 
28 Vandevelde Kenneth, 'A Brief History of International Investment Agreements' [2005] 12(1) UC Davis 
Journal of International Law and Policy 157–161. However, similar agreements relating to investment 
protection of property abroad have been concluded as early as in the 18th century. At that time States concluded 
so-called treaties on friendship, commerce and navigation (hereafter FCN), whose contents were strikingly 
similar to those of the early BITs despite the fact that they mainly addressed trade issues. Especially the United 
States was active in concluding such treaties. See Sornarajah M., The International Law on Foreign 
Investment (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 180. 28 For more information about the history of IIAs 
prior 1959 see Vandevelde Kenneth, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (Oxford 
University Press 2010) Chapter 2. 
29 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (Germany–Pakistan BIT), 25 November 1959 (entered into force 28 April). A replacing treaty was 
signed 1 December 2009 but it is not in force to this day. 
30 In 1959 there was one BIT, at the end of 1969 there were 72, by the end of 1979 this number had about 
doubled to 165 and by the end of 1989 it had doubled again, to 385. At that time the figures began to increase 
explosively, and over the next ten years the number of BITs grew to 1,857, which means a four-fold increase. 
At the end of 2005, the total number was approximately 2,500 so the rate of growth had slowed down notably. 
Gimblett Jonathan and Johnson Thomas, 'From Gunboats to BITs: The evolution of modern international 
investment law' in Sauvant Karl (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010-2011 (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 685. 
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least one BIT, and there are nearly 3,000 BITs in force accompanied by over 300 trade 
agreements with investment provisions.31 The bar chart below illustrates the proliferation of 
IIAs from 1980 to 2016. 
 
Figure 1. The boom in the number of IIAs 32 
While navigating through the extensive number of IIAs, it is common and rather helpful to 
group them into three different generations: treaties concluded between 1959 and the mid-
1980s are referred as the first generation, and those concluded between the mid-1980s and 
mid-1990s as the second generation. Agreements signed after 1995 belong to the third 
generation.33  
The first generation of BITs was characterised by asymmetrical economic and political 
relationships between capital exporting countries and capital importing countries; seemingly 
reciprocal agreements were in reality a tool for developed capital exporting countries to 
                                                 
31 UNCTAD, 'International Investment Agreements Navigator' (Investment Policy Hub) Available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA. The explosion in IIA practice had two primary causes: first, there 
was an increased political commitment by governments in both developed and developing countries to 
economic liberalism and the freer international flow of goods, services and investment. Second was the lack 
of developing counties' alternatives to FDI as international lending and aid, both important sources of 
development financing in the 1970s and early 1980s, became increasingly scarce. Consequently, the 
competition for FDI coupled with an increasing acceptance of liberal economic policies provided the fertile 
ground for the conclusion of investment treaties. See Newconbe and Paradell (n 34) 48–49. 
32 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017 (United Nations Publication 2017) 111. 
33 Van Os Roos and Knottnerus Roeline, 'Dutch Bilateral Investment Treaties: A gateway to 'treaty shopping' 
for investment protection by multilateral companies' (Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations 
(SOMO), 2011) 8. 
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protect the financial interests of their nationals abroad.34 With the second generation came 
the trend of BITs concluded between non-industrialised States, giving its contribution to the 
upswing of the BIT network.35 More importantly, during the first two generations, IIAs saw 
a significant upgrade in the level of investment protection, especially owing to the inclusion 
of ISDS mechanisms. The innovation of ISDS meant that for the first time, foreign investors 
had an effective remedy for unlawful actions by host States that was not dependent on the 
willingness of their home State to pursue their claim. Therefore, these BIT provisions 
depoliticised investment disputes and "placed investment protection in the realm of law 
rather than politics".36 Nevertheless, until early 1990s there was no significant case law in 
the field of international investments. In the past 25 years, as a direct consequence of the 
availability of investment-State arbitration, the situation has changed dramatically.37  
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
newest generation of BITs involves a few distinguishable trends that aspire to greater 
certainty regarding the scope and extent of State's treaty obligations.38 For example, BITs 
seem to cover broader sets of issues, especially some of the key public policy objectives 
where more room for host State regulation is needed. The protection of safety, health, labour 
rights and the environment etc. now stand side-by-side with the economic aspects of 
investment. In addition, new patterns of BIT formulation have emerged as the wording of 
various substantive provisions, such as indirect expropriation, has been revised to ensure an 
unambiguous interpretation of these protection standards. Further, modern BITs deviate 
from traditional definitions of investment and investor. Contracting States have attempted to 
find ways to formulate definitions that would be sufficiently comprehensive (i.e. not so strict 
that they would hinder foreign investment), but that would not to cover assets or investors 
                                                 
34 Newcombe Andrew and Paradell Lluís, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties Standards of 
Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009) 43. Until 1968, when the Indonesia-Netherlands BIT expressly 
provided for investor-State arbitration, BITs only contained State-State dispute resolution through arbitration 
or the ICJ. For a long time the Iraq-Kuwait BIT (signed 1964) was the only BIT not falling within the 
developed-developed State pattern. It should be also noted that some major developing countries, such as India 
and China, did not conclude BITs until at the turn of 1st and 2nd generation.  
35 In the period between 2003 and 2006, treaties between two developing nations outnumbered those between 
developed and developing countries. Dolzer Rudolf and Schreuer Christoph, Principles of International 
Investment Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press 2012) 7. 
36 Vandevelde (n 1) 175. ISDS mechanisms are dealt with in greater detail in Section 2.3 of this Study. 
37 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 35) 11. The number of investor-State disputes inflated from 6 known cases in 1995 
to 226 in 2005, and up to 444 by the end of 2015. The year 2013 saw the second largest number of known 
investment arbitrations filed in a single year (56), bringing the total number of known cases to 568. So far 
majority of cases are resolved in favour of the State. It should be noted that these figures do not include ad hoc 
arbitrations which are mainly conducted in secrecy, away from the public eye. UNCTAD, Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2015, IIA Issues Note No. 2 (United Nations Publication 2016).  
38 van Os and Knottnerus (n 33) 9. 
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that the contracting States did not really mean to protect.39 The latter trend is relevant for the 
research questions of this Study because treaty formulations are the main enabler of treaty 
shopping and revising the language could also serve as one of the methods for States to take 
control over treaty shopping practice.40 
2.2. Objective and Purpose of the Investment Regime 
As described above, almost every country in the world has concluded IIAs, thereby 
committing themselves to observe specific standards on the treatment of foreign investments 
within their territory. BITs have become the dominant mechanism for international 
regulation of foreign investment, and therefore they form the core of the investment regime.  
Through IIAs, States offer enhanced security to foreign investors by guaranteeing an 
additional layer of protection beyond that provided by domestic laws. Thus, from a policy 
perspective, the host State deliberately renounces an element of its sovereignty in return for 
a certain new opportunity: the possibility to better attract new foreign investments that it 
would not have achieved without an IIA.41 This is necessary because making foreign 
investment differs from engaging in trade transactions. Whereas a typical trade deal consists 
of a one-time exchange of goods and money, the decision to invest in a foreign country 
initiates a long-term relationship between the investor and the host Sate.42  
So, what are States looking for when they sign an IIA? According to Professors Schreuer 
and Dolzer, the leading scholars in the field of investment law, "the objective and purpose 
                                                 
39 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Recent Developments in International Investment 
Agreements (2005) IIA MONITOR No. 2: International Investment Agreements 4–6. 
40 See Section 5.2.2 of this Study. 
41 Chaisse Julien, 'The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to 
Investment Treaties and Arbitration' [2015] 11(2) Hastings Business Law Journal 236; Dolzer and Scheuer 
(n 35) 22. In addition, Professor Andrew Kerner argues that BITs enhance States credibility in the eyes of a 
foreign investor on two levels: ex-ante costs (signals), and ex-post costs (commitments). Signalling, in the case 
of IIAs, may be defined as "sending a broadly received 'signal' that a country is trustworthy." With regards to 
the latter one, Professor Kerner suggests that BITs are effective because they "present significant ex-post costs 
to signatory states that violate the agreement." From this point of view, a BIT is a commitment device. Kerner 
Andrew, 'Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties' [2009] 
53(1) International Studies Quarterly 74. 
42 Moreover, the investor is most likely required to sink substantial resources into the investment in the outset 
of it, and the expectation is to recoup this amount added with an adequate rate of return during the lifetime of 
the investment (sometimes up to 30 years or more). Foreign investments take place in different forms, inter 
alia committing capital directly or indirectly through portfolio investment or by licensing the use of technology. 
The investors who, for example, enter into joint ventures or purchase land or other immovable property from 
a foreign State cannot break loose from that engagement that easily. Thus, investors are vulnerable to sudden 
and unwanted changes in the political or legal scheme of the State. That is why BITs must be long in duration, 
usually 10 to 20 years with certain continuing coverage after its termination. See more in Subedi (n 44) 108 
and Schreuer Christoph, 'Investments, International Protection' in Wolfrum Rüdiger (ed), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2010) paras 1–2. 
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of investment treaties is closely tied to the desirability and to the nature of foreign 
investments, to the benefits for the host state and for the investor, to the conditions necessary 
for the promotion of foreign investment, and, conversely, to the removal of obstacles that 
may stand in the way of allowing and channelling more foreign investment into the host 
states."43 Foreign investment is often deemed an engine of financial growth, a stimulator of 
the local economy, and a source of foreign currency income, new skills, information and 
know-how.44 IIAs are a purposeful tool to guarantee a stable investment framework as, 
unlike domestic laws, a State cannot unilaterally change the treaty provisions when it suits 
them. 
Consequently, the underlying purpose of the investment system is to attract FDI by 
addressing typical risks of foreign investment, thereby creating a level playing field and a 
stable, investment-friendly climate.45 However, understanding the objectives and nature of 
the investment regime would not be complete without addressing subject of investment 
arbitration. ISDS is a fundamental part of comprehensive investment protection and thus it 
is necessary to understand the main aspects of the ISDS system, to which we now turn. 
2.3. The Significance of the ISDS and the 1965 ICSID Convention 
Access to a dispute settlement mechanism normally ranks very high on the purported Treaty 
Shopper's list of requirements. The substantive safeguards provided in IIAs are of no use 
unless they can be efficiently enforced in case of a violation. That is why ISDS mechanisms 
                                                 
43 Dolzer Rudolf and Schreuer Christoph, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn Oxford 
University Press 2012) 22. 
44 Subedi Surya, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (3rd edn, Hart 
Publishing 2016) 107–108. 
45 However, the question whether IIAs actually succeed in their mission to bring in foreign capital is, at best, 
controversial. In fact, several empirical studies have found little or no positive connection between the 
conclusion of IIAs and increase in foreign investment flow. Van Harten Gus, 'Five Justifications for Investment 
Treaties: A Critical Discussion' [2010] 2(1) Trade, Law and Development 30–31. For researches with different 
findings see UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998); 
Hallward-Dreimeier Mary, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit 
and They Could Bite (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2003); Tobin Jennifer and Rose-Ackerman 
Susan, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Yale Law and Economics Research Paper No. 293 (2004); Salacuse Jeswald and 
Sullivan Nicholas, 'Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand 
Bargain' [2005] 46(1) Harvard International Law Journal 67–120; Neumayer Eric and Spess Laura, Do 
bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries? LSE Research Online 
(2005). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/World_Dev_(BITs).pdf (accessed 23 March 2018); Yackee 
Jason, Sacrificing Sovereignty: Bilateral Investment Treaties, International Arbitration, and the Quest for 
Capital, USC Center in Law, Economics and Organization Research Paper No C06-15 (2006) and Poulsen 
L.S., 'The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the 
Evidence' in Sauvant Karl (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2009/2010 (Oxford 
University Press 2010). 
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play a major role in the investment regime; basically the possibility to initiate arbitration 
against the State gives "teeth" to the substantive obligations of an IIA. Therefore, it is 
understandable that the ISDS provision is a great incentive to engage in treaty shopping.  
The ISDS mechanism was designed to overcome the clumsy institution of diplomatic 
protection that made investors dependent on the political discretion of their governments.46 
Before the development of ISDS, a foreign investor only had two avenues to pursue if the 
host state interfered with its investment: (i) to seek relief before the local courts of the host 
State; or (ii) to request diplomatic protection from its own State. Both options have limited 
appeal for a foreign investor, as in local courts there is a possibility of partiality and/or bias, 
whereas diplomatic protection provides no guarantee that the investor's home State would 
espouse the claim, which leaves the investor completely at the mercy of the State and its 
politics.47 Conversely, modern BITs have equipped investors with a direct and independent 
standing to assert their own rights under international law without the barrier of the 
requirement to exhaust local remedies first.48 Namely, the BIT system re-allocates powers 
from States to investors and thus plays a crucial role in the investment regime.49  
The most relevant international agreement for the law and practice of ISDS is the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(hereafter the ICSID Convention).50 It provides a procedural framework for settling disputes 
between host States and foreign investors from other contracting States through arbitration 
and conciliation.51 The ICSID Convention, which established the International Centre for 
                                                 
46 Under the system of diplomatic protection a State overtakes the claim of its national and pursues it in its own 
name. The government may refuse to take up the claim, it may discontinue diplomatic protection at any time. 
It may also waive the national’s claim or agree to a reduced settlement. As soon as the national State has taken 
up the claim, it becomes part of the foreign policy process with all the consequent political risks. See Schreuer 
Christoph, 'Investment Protection and International Relations' in Reinisch August and Kriebaum 
Ursula (eds), The Law of International Relations, Liber amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold (Eleven International 
Publishing 2007) 345.  
47 Nadakavukaren Schefer Krista, International Investment Law Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd 2016) 364; UNCTAD, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement 2014 (n 21) 23. 
48 The Working Group of the International Law Association (ILA) German Branch Sub–Committee on 
Investment Law, 'The Determination of the Nationality of Investors Under Investment Protection Treaties' 
(2011) Transnational International Law Research Centre, Online report. 11. 
49 See more about the relation between diplomatic protection and investor's rights in Kulick Andreas, Global 
Interest in International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 10–38. There is an interesting 
debate about whether investor's rights under BIT are independent or merely a derivative from State's rights. 
With this regard see also Wälde Thomas, New Aspects of International Investment Law (Centre d'Etude et de 
Recherche de Droit 2004) discussing the multiple asymmetries of investment arbitration. 
50 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 575 UNTS 159, Washington 18 March 
1965 (entered into force 14 October 1966). ICSID Convention is also known as the Washington Convention. 
51 Dolzer and Schreuer have described the ICSID Convention as "the boldest innovative step in the modern 
history of international cooperation concerning the role and protection of foreign investment". Dolzer and 
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Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or the Centre), was created by the World Bank52 
primarily to fill the gap that had long existed in international law due to the fact that private 
parties could not bring claims against States if States breached their international 
obligations.53 Nowadays, the majority of IIAs provide ICSID as the main arbitration forum.54 
Unlike IIAs that guarantee standards for substantive investment protection, the ICSID 
Convention contains procedural and jurisdictional remedies.55 The system is exclusively 
designed for international disputes, and its objective is to offer foreign investors a neutral 
and independent body to settle disputes with host States in a speedy manner so that investors 
are better protected and that, in turn, would attract more investments to the Contracting 
States.56 In this regard, ICSID facilitates depoliticisation of investment disputes in the sense 
that a confrontation between home State and host State can be avoided.57 Furthermore, the 
availability of a flexible and fair hearing in a neutral forum facilitates foreign investments as 
investors do not have to worry about national courts being biased towards the State.58  
The ICSID arbitration is only accessible to investors that are nationals of ICSID Convention 
Member States, and only against other Member States. For a Treaty Shopper, the ICSID 
system is desirable because the Convention contains stricter grounds for annulment and 
refusal of enforcement of the award than what is provided in the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereafter New York 
Convention), which commonly governs non-ICSID arbitrations.59 Further, ICSID 
proceedings are mostly public and the awards of ICSID tribunals are published, which gives 
                                                 
Schreuer (n 43) 9. See also Franck Susan, 'The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration 
Awards' [2011] 51(4) Virginia Journal of International Law. 
52 The World Bank pays the running costs of ICSID and the Administrative Council of ICSID is composed 
largely of the representatives of World Bank member states. Further, the President of the World Bank is ex 
officio the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council.  
53 Collins (n 8) 233. 
54 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 'Scope and Definition' (UNCTAD Series on Issues 
in International Investment Agreements II, 2011) 1. 
55 Badia Albert, Piercing the Veil of State Enterprises in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 
2014) 141. 
56 García–Bolívar Omar e, 'The Issue of a Foreign Company Wholly Owned by National Shareholders in the 
Context of ICSID Arbitration' [2006] 2(5) Transnational Dispute Management 7; Collins (n 8) 233–234. 
57 Bhagnani Preeti, 'Revisiting the Countermeasures Defense in Investor–State Disputes: Approach and 
Analogies', in Bjorklund Andrea (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy, 2013–
2014 (Oxford University Press 2015) 452–453. 
58 As an Irish writer Humphrey O'Sullivan expressed in 1979: "There is little use in going to law with the devil 
while the court is in hell". See. H. O'Sullivan, Cı ́n Lae Amhlaoibh, The Diary of an Irish Countryman 1827–
1835 (T de Bhaldraithe trans, 1979 edn). 
59 Reinisch August, 'Methods of Dispute Resolution' in Muchlinski, Ortino and Schreuer (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 700–701; Skinner Matthew, Miles 
Cameron and Luttrell Sam, 'Access and advantage in investor-state arbitration: The law and practice of treaty 
shopping' [2010] 3(3) Journal of World Energy Law & Business 265–266. 
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States a notable incentive to settle investment disputes instead of risking potential adverse 
publicity that may result from an open hearing and possibly unfavourable award.60 Thus, if 
the IIA in question does not contain an ICSID clause, an investor may be tempted to shop 
into a treaty that secures availability to the ICSID mechanism by relocating to a Contracting 
State. In other words, dispute settlement provisions, especially an ICSID clause is a valuable 
item on the "sophisticated Treaty Shopper’s list".61 
To conclude, the principal goals of ISDS are: avoidance of direct State confrontation in the 
event of a dispute (namely depoliticising of an investment dispute) and avoiding the 
possibility of corrupt, dysfunctional and/or biased local courts and a weak legal system in 
the host State.62 
3. PLACING TREATY SHOPPING IN CONTEXT 
Having introduced the cornerstones of the investment regime and investment arbitration, in 
this Chapter, I advance to elaborate on the concept of treaty shopping. First, I will define 
what the term means and analyse the reasons for the occurrence of treaty shopping. Then I 
will discuss the principal ways to execute it in practice. Placing treaty shopping in the context 
of its philosophical background is useful not only for examining the phenomenon on a 
practical level, but also for evaluating its nature, and later analysing arbitral decisions 
relating to it. Further, I will examine the possible pros and cons of the phenomenon and, 
subsequently, list the most common objections presented by States. I aim to evaluate these 
objections critically and clarify whether treaty shopping is the root of the problem or not. 
Understanding the arguments for and against the phenomenon is also helpful to understand 
the issues underlined in the case law, which is dealt with in Chapter 4. Finally, I will explain 
the significance of investor's nationality in relation to the topic of this Study. 
                                                 
60 ibid 267; McIlwrath Michael and Savage John, International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide 
(Kluwer Law International 2010) 391. 
61 Skinner et.al. (n 59) 267. See Section 5.3 of this Study. 
62 Schultz Thomas and Dupont Cédric, 'Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-
empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study' [2015] 25(4) The European Journal of International 
Law 1147–1168; Primec Jan, Enemy of the State: Is Treaty Shopping in Contradiction with the Rationale of 
Investment Law? (University of Amsterdam 2015) 32. The advantages of ISDS also include speediness, 
flexibility, effectiveness and a high level of expert input. In addition the parties have higher level of control 
over the procedure (for example the possibility of selecting arbitrators, negotiating procedural rules, applicable 
law, seat of arbitration etc.) 
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3.1. What Is Treaty Shopping? 
In light of the overall controversy surrounding the legitimacy of treaty shopping, it should 
be noted that even the meaning of the term "treaty shopping" does not enjoy universal 
consensus.63 This overall uncertainty is also reflected by the variety of names used to 
describe the phenomenon. "Treaty planning", "nationality planning", "corporate 
restructuring", "corporate manoeuvring" and even "treaty abuse" have all been used to 
characterise similar situations. The terminological choice often uncovers the writer's attitude 
towards the practice. Even without such a striking choice of words, the notion of treaty 
shopping tends to be charged with more negative than positive nuance.64  
As a starting point, it is important to note that despite the bad publicity and increasingly 
expressed dissatisfaction among States, treaty shopping is not per se prohibited or even 
improper under international investment law.65 However, numerous States have regarded 
corporate restructuring or related measures carried out for the purpose of obtaining better 
treaty benefits as undesirable and have taken some measures against it.66 In addition, the 
legal practice demonstrates that there are some limits to treaty shopping. These limits are 
examined further in Chapter 5. 
Returning to definition of treaty shopping, the term most often refers to the conduct of 
foreign investors who deliberately shop for a "home country of convenience" that has 
favourable IIAs with the host country where their investments are or will be made.67 The 
shopping is carried out by altering corporate structures or routing investments through the 
country/countries necessary to gain access to an IIA even if there is none in place between 
                                                 
63 Chaisse Julien, 'The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to 
Investment Treaties and Arbitration' [2015] 11(2) Hastings Business Law Journal 228; Baumgartner Jorun, 
Treaty Shopping in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 7–9. 
64 The negative connotation attached to treaty shopping activities may be due to the association with the 
debatable problem in international tax law where corporate structures are established in "tax havens" with the 
sole purpose of gaining advantages from more favourable tax treaties. See more in Baumgartner, 'Treaty 
Shopping' (n 63) 7–8. 
65 Chaisse (n 63) 228; Van Os and Knottnerus (n 33) 10–11. Skinner et al. have suggested that the lack of 
outright ban of treaty shopping can be attributed to e.g. the absence of uniform barriers to this practice in the 
express provisions of BITs and the absence of the common law doctrine of precedent in international 
investment law. See more in Skinner et al. (n 59) 261. 
66 See State reactions in Section 5.1 and Dolzer and Schreuer (n 51) 52. 
67 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 'Investor–State Disputes Arising from Investment 
Treaties: A Review' in UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development (United Nations 
Publication, 2005) 21–22. 
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the host State and investor's actual home State. Alternatively, if such IIA exists, investors 
may "shop" to acquire the benefits of a more favourable IIA.68  
An example will suffice to explain this practice: a Norwegian investor plans to make a 
considerable investment in Serbia. After looking into the BITs Norway has concluded, the 
investor notices that its home State does not have an agreement with Serbia. The next step 
is to look around for BITs between Serbia and other States. The investor happens to own a 
shell company in Finland, a State that does have a BIT with Serbia. However, the Finland-
Serbia BIT69 requires that the investor, besides being incorporated in Finland, has "its 
registered office or central administration or principal place of business within the 
jurisdiction of that Contracting Party." Since our Norwegian investor does not pursue any 
economic activities in Finland, it will not qualify as an investor under that BIT. Then again, 
the Netherlands-Serbia BIT70 merely requires incorporation. The Norwegian investor 
therefore decides to establish another shell company, this time in the Netherlands, and that 
way route its investment though an intermediate company. The investor thus "planned" its 
nationality in order to gain the highest level of protection available. 
To summarise, the Treaty Shopper aims for maximum protection of the investment under 
the operative treaties. The means of carrying out treaty shopping are considered in greater 
detail in Section 3.3, but first it is necessary to understand the causes of the phenomenon and 
the function of nationality in this setting. In the next Section, we move on to discuss the 
question as to where treaty shopping phenomenon stems from and why are investors inclined 
to take the trouble to reorganise their investments or even their whole business just to be 
qualified under a certain IIA. 
 
 
                                                 
68 Muchlinski Peter, 'Corporations and the Uses of Law: International Investment Arbitration as a 'Multilateral 
Legal Order'' [2011] 1(4) Oñati Socio–Legal Series 1; Chaisse (n 63) 228. 
69 Agreement Between the republic of Finland and Serbia and Montenegro on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (Finland-Serbia BIT) 23 May 2005 (entered into force 29 October 2005). See Article 1(3)(b). 
70 Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Netherlands-Serbia BIT) 29 January 2002 (entered into 
force 1 March 2004). See Article 1(b)(ii). 
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3.2. Seeds of Treaty Shopping Phenomenon 
Restructuring corporate chains and investment projects always requires some level of 
planning, time and effort from the foreign investor. The benefits are obvious if the investor 
manages to gain protections it was not entitled to before treaty shopping. But which factors 
motivate investors to carry out such operations? And what are the circumstances that allow 
it? 
Before the turn of the last century, the concept of treaty shopping was nearly unknown, or at 
least very insignificant, in investment arbitration.71 In fact, the first explicit mention of the 
practice of treaty shopping can be found in the Maffezini decision from 2000.72 Since then 
foreign investors have discovered the advantages of treaty shopping and increasingly used it 
to secure maximum treaty protection for their investments. But where does the phenomenon 
of treaty shopping stem from? Three main factors are essentially responsible for the 
occurrence and expansion of treaty shopping: proliferation of the BIT network, development 
of investors' self-standing rights instead of diplomatic protection, and the fact that diversity 
of corporate nationality is relatively easy to create by incorporating legal entities in countries 
other than the investor's principal place of business.73 
The most important explanation for the occurrence of treaty shopping is the sheer number of 
IIAs. Such a plethora of treaties distributed worldwide is a unique characteristic of 
investment law. In theory, a dense network of treaties provides as many possibilities to treaty 
shop as there are IIAs in force.74 The often used "spaghetti-bowl" metaphor is illustrative. 
                                                 
71 Baumgartner Jorun, Treaty Shopping in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2016)  
19–20. 
72 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction (25 January 2000) para 63: "It is clear, in any event, that a distinction has to be made 
between the legitimate extension of rights and benefits by means of the operation of the clause, on the one 
hand, and disruptive treaty-shopping that would play havoc with the policy objectives of underlying specific 
treaty provisions, on the other hand." 
73 Some scholars have also added the absence of a doctrine of precedent in international investment law on the 
list. Although not specific to treaty shopping, but the whole investment regime as a whole, the lack of 
precedents might create an incentive to bring claims based on treaty shopping on grounds of often widely 
diverging jurisprudence. See e.g. Skinner et. al. (n 59) 261. 
74 Accordingly, some scholars have submitted that treaty shopping would be greatly reduced (and useless) if 
there was one far-reaching multilateral agreement on investment. See e.g. Bekker Pieter, 'Is Arbitration Based 
on “Treaty Shopping” In Jeopardy?' (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 17 June 2009). Available at: 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2009/06/17/is-arbitration-based-on-treaty-shopping-in-jeopardy/ 
(accessed 19 March 2018) and Leal-Arcas Rafael, 'The Multilateralization of International Investment 
Law' [2009] 10(6) Journal of World Investment and Trade 865, 919. For more information about global 
investment treaty as a way to curb treaty shopping, see Subsection 5.2.3 of this Study. 
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The figure below depicts the multi-layered nature of the global IIA system and the 
intertwined network of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. 
 
Figure 2. The "spaghetti bowl "of IIAs portrays the supply of treaties available to a potential Treaty Shopper.75  
Despite the large number of separate IIAs, their main contents are somewhat uniform.76 
Nevertheless, some differences in details can be found. These small alterations, especially 
pertaining to the lenient definition of investor and certain dispute resolution mechanisms, 
can affect the level of investment protection to a surprising extent. Treaties with broad 
wording are generally perceived as more beneficial, as they provide more room for 
manoeuvre. The subtle divergences enable and encourage foreign investors to shop for better 
alternatives. After all, investing in a foreign country is generally a long-term commitment in 
which the investor sinks substantial resources.77 Making sure that the investment is protected 
in the best possible manner is merely sensible business. Consequently, multiplicity of 
agreements granting various rights and protections is a key ingredient to the practice of treaty 
shopping. 
The emergence of the treaty shopping phenomenon was also furthered by the introduction 
of ISDS clauses in investment treaties. As discussed above, this development brought a 
                                                 
75 UNCTAD, based on World Bank. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investment 
Provisions in Economic Integration Agreements (United Nations Publication 2005) 10. 
76 Shaw Malcolm, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 609. 
77 Dolzer and Scheuer (n 35) 3. 
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substantial paradigm change; investment protection was no longer in the realm of diplomatic 
protection, but private investors were granted a self-standing right to bring claims against 
the host State in case of a violation of their rights.78 Without this fundamental shift, treaty 
shopping would most likely be inconsequential, if not theoretically impossible altogether, as 
it is the independent standing of foreign investors that gives them the possibility (and 
incentive) to enforce claims in a particular forum and treaty framework, which they perceive 
to be the most favourable.79 Consequently, investors' direct standing is yet another key factor 
to the practice of treaty shopping. 
From European perspective the situation is currently looking interesting. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gave its decision on Achmea v. Slovakia case (C-
284/16) in March 2018 declaring ISDS provisions of intra-EU BITs incompatible with the 
EU law.80 For now, the future of intra-EU BITs is hanging in the balance. Therefore, for EU 
based investors investing in another EU Member State, the ruling gives an additional 
incentive treaty shop to ensure that their corporate structure includes at least one entity 
outside the EU in a country that has a BIT with the relevant host State. It remains to be seen 
whether this development increases treaty shopping practice within the EU. 
The final factor facilitating the occurrence of treaty shopping in international investment law 
is the relative ease of establishing particular legal entities, thereby creating diversity of 
nationality.81 As mentioned above, in many domestic jurisdictions mere incorporation is 
sufficient for a juridical entity to acquire legal personality and corporate nationality.82 These 
companies (often with no more than a post-box address) are typically simple to set up and, 
if necessary, insert into an existing corporate chain to maximise investment protection in the 
face of, for example, increasing political risks in the host State. In addition, shareholdings 
are nowadays highly transferable, which makes it easy to assign shares of an investment to 
an entity with the required nationality.83 Therefore, foreign investors are able to make 
                                                 
78 Douglas Zachary, The International Law of Investment Claims (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) 
Rules 1 and 2. 
79 Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 27. 
80 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The 
Slovak Republic), Judgement if the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (6 March 2018). Request 
for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, 
Germany). For closer examination of the Achmea case see Fouchard Clément and Krestin Marc, 'The Judgment 
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changes in their corporate structures, and thus shop for an advantageous treaty, relatively 
quickly as a response to developments in the host State's investment climate. 
In conclusion, the combination of investment regime specific features is the seed of treaty 
shopping practice. The more legal instruments regulating protection of foreign investment 
exists, and the less harmonised the coordinated they are, the more incentivised investors are 
to gain the protection of the IIA (one or several) that serves its purposes the best. At least 
there is no harm trying as the shopping "operation" is often not too burdensome. 
3.3. Treaty Shopping Methods 
There are two basic scenarios in which treaty shopping can enhance the investor's position: 
i) the investor's home State (Country X) does not have a BIT with the host State (Country Y) 
but a third State (Country Z) has; or ii) Country X has a valid BIT with Country Y but the 
provisions under the BIT between Country Z and Country Y are more advantageous.84 In 
effect, the investor seeks to become a national of Country Z and thus eligible for treaty 
protection under the BIT in question. The following figure illustrates these two situations. 
 
 
Figure 3. Typical situation of treaty shopping through an intermediate company85 
                                                 
84 The example in the text is drawn from Skinner et al. (n 59) 267. For more elaborate analysis in the context 
of umbrella clauses see 267–270 thereof.  
85 Author's modification from the figure in van Os and Knottnerus (n 33) 10. 
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The patterns in making nationality changes also vary and can create extremely complicated 
corporate structures. In essence, treaty shopping occurs in two principal ways: direct and 
indirect arrangements to channel investments through a preferred country. The investor can 
incorporate in the target State by establishing a new subsidiary under the laws of the State 
in question. Then the investor inserts the subsidiary in its existing corporate chain and 
transfers the control over the original investments to that new entity (the pattern 
demonstrated in Figure 3).86 The newly founded holding company can be nothing more than 
a shell without any economic activity, merely owning the investment.87 Thus, the ultimate 
controlling party is still the same. Another method of gaining nationality is by acquiring an 
already existing corporation that is a national under the desired IIA and channelling the 
investment through that company.88 Both manoeuvres have raised questions whether arbitral 
tribunals should primarily examine the substance of the relationship between the investor 
and the host State, rather than merely focus on its form.89 The details of this discussion and 
the most relevant case law are tackled in the following Chapter.  
Moreover, the types of treaty shopping can be divided by a temporal element. Some 
commentators, such as Skinner, Miles and Luttrell, have used the terms "back end" and 
"front end" treaty shopping to describe the classification. "Back end" refers to situations 
where the investor performs nationality changing arrangements after the investment is 
already under some imminent threat (for instance, revocation of a licence or termination of 
a contract) or even after the dispute between the host State and the legal entity has already 
materialised.90 As for "front end" type, the phrasing means that the foreign investor plans its 
                                                 
86 Lee Chieh, 'Resolving Nationality Planning Issue through the Application of the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil in International Investment Arbitration' [2016] 9(1) Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 99; 
Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 13–14. 
87 ibid 99–100. This happened in e.g. Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Investment SRL, Tidewater Caribe, C.A., et al. 
v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (8 February 
2008) 
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Maniema S.A.R.L. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No ARB/98/7, Award (1 September 
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del Este, S.A. v. The Dominican Republic LCIA Case No UN 7927, Award on Preliminary Objections to 
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UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012–12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (17 December 2015). 
89 In addition to the two ways introduced here, investors can also engage treaty shopping by transfer of claims 
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IIA. This form of treaty shopping is relatively rare as it is highly problematic with regard to jurisdiction ratione 
temporis. Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 13–14. For case law see e.g. Mihaly International 
Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, Award (15 March 
2002) and Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/3, Award 26 June 2003). 
90 Chaisse (n 63) 228; Skinner et al. (n 59) 260–261. 
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nationality in advance pursuant to the BIT of convenience.91 That is, before the dispute arises 
or even before initiating the investment itself. The former method has evoked a strong 
reaction from arbitral tribunals, and it has been frowned upon in many cases whereas the 
latter has mostly been characterised as appropriate nationality planning or company 
strategy.92  
Finally, it should be noted that none of these scenarios is confined to foreign investors as 
also nationals of the host State are also known to internationalise a wholly domestic matter 
to avail themselves of IIAs their country has concluded with foreign countries.93 This 
internationalisation of domestic investment disputes has been a major cause of friction in 
international investment law. In general, attitudes towards both the legality and desirability 
of treaty shopping differ, often depending on one's interest and position within the system. 
Next, I will consider some arguments for and against treaty shopping. 
3.4. Possible Benefits of Allowing Treaty Shopping 
Despite the fact that treaty shopping as a concept has a rather negative connotation it can 
also have some positive nuances, and it might essentially enhance the underlying objectives 
of the whole investment law system. As discussed in Chapter 2, nearly all IIAs are grounded 
on two elementary premises: foreign investment tends to spur economic development, and 
fundamental legal protections tend to encourage and promote foreign investment.94 To reach 
the goals, the investment regime is designed to provide a reasonable level of security from 
the host State's arbitrary or discriminatory measures, guarantee fair and equal treatment and, 
in most cases, allow direct access to effective dispute settlement mechanisms, so as to avoid 
possibly biased courts of the host State and the need to resort to diplomatic protection.95 
When foreign investors engage in treaty shopping, they do so in pursuance of greater 
protection for their investments – which basically comprises of exactly the same aspects as 
goals of investment law. One could say that, theoretically, a Treaty Shopper gains no more 
than what the investment law was tailored to provide. Further, encouraging non-
                                                 
91 ibid. 
92 Such as Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic. Here, the tribunal found that the practice of this belated 
corporate restructuring in order to gain better treaty benefits was a "breach of the fundamental caveat of good 
faith". See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award (15 April 2009) 
and Section 5.3 below. 
93 Muchlinski (n 68) 3. 
94 Legum Barton, 'Defining Investment and Investor: Who Is Entitled to Claim?' [2006] 22(4) Arbitration 
International 2; OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising 
Costs (OECD Publishing 2002). 
95 See Chapter 2 of this Study. 
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discrimination is vital to promote foreign investment, as investors take higher risks when 
conducting business in an unfamiliar jurisdiction. That entails not only treating foreign 
investors like domestic investors under similar circumstances, but also providing equal 
treatment among foreign investors of different nationalities.96 Thus, treaty shopping has the 
potential of levelling the playing field for foreign investors as they are able to customise 
their treaty coverage regardless where they originate.97 
Also, in case law, some tribunals have embraced the idea of purposeful nationality planning. 
For example, in Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, the tribunal held that “It is not uncommon in 
practice and – absent a particular limitation – not illegal to locate one’s operations in a 
jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial regulatory and legal environment…including 
the availability of a BIT.” Further it noted: "The language of the definition of national in 
many BITs evidences that such national routing of investment is entirely in keeping with the 
purpose of the instruments and the motivations of the state parties."98  
As a conclusion, when viewed through the lens of the rationale and purpose of the investment 
regime, it could be said that treaty shopping coincides with the spirit of the underlying 
system.99 Treaty shopping has the potential to further liberate investment law and therefore 
enhance FDI flow.100 Capital mobility, in turn, promotes economic development and 
                                                 
96 Von Moltke Konrad, Discrimination and Non-Discrimination in Foreign Direct Investment (OECD 
Publishing 2002) 3. Concretely this is done in the form of adherence to the principles of national treatment and 
most-favoured nation treatment.  Despite the efforts, inequalities do exists. Treaty shopping practice can be 
seen as investor's response to fix these inequalities by themselves. 
97 Similar in Wälde Thomas, 'International Investment Law: An Overview of Key Concepts and 
Methodology' [2007] 4(4) Transnational Dispute Management 53. "The Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine case has 
opened the door to domestic investors organised through a foreign, member-state holding company. There are 
indeed arguments for pursuing this course, in particular as this would eliminate the difference in treatment 
between foreign investors (treaty-protected) and domestic investors (not protected)…" (emphasis added). 
98 See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia (n 173) paras 330(d) and 332. 
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State Dispute Settlement Public Consultation: 16 May - 9 July 2012 (OECD Publishing 2012) para 160. 
100 In this regard one should bear in mind that the question whether IIAs succeed in their purpose of attracting 
foreign investments is (at the very least) contested as numerous empirical surveys have reached surprisingly 
different conclusions. The usefulness of IIAs is a rich area of debate by itself, and thus beyond the scope of 
this Study. For more about the topic see e.g.  Sauvant Karl and Sachs Lisa, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign 
Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford 
University Press 2009) and Hallward-Driemeier Mary, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign 
Direct Investment? Only a Bit and They Could Bite (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2003). 
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international trade as a whole. Moreover, such practice is inevitable part of modern business 
activity. There is, without a doubt, room for abuses. However, in the context of treaty 
shopping, these abuses are limited to situations where corporate restructuring is done with 
the sole purpose of gaining access to investment arbitration in anticipation of an upcoming 
dispute. Investment tribunals are increasingly condemning such behaviour and setting limits 
on legitimate forms of treaty shopping. Treaty shopping through corporate restructuring 
remains legal as there are no rules outright prohibiting it – nor there should be. 
3.5. Why Is Treaty Shopping So Contentious? 
After defining treaty shopping and the reasons for its occurrence and popularity, one 
important question arises: if treaty shopping is not forbidden, why does it cause so much 
controversy? States have put across several potential policy concerns relates to the practice 
of treaty shopping. In this Section, I will explain the most common objections: reciprocity, 
sovereign consent, sustainable development and governance gap. I analyse critically each 
arguments' justification and credibility. Considerations against treaty shopping, especially 
the last two on the list, often seem to concern the investment system as a whole, and therefore 
it is likely that the solutions lie somewhere else as well. The thematics of this part of the 
Study revolve around both political and legal considerations. This is because when signing 
IIAs, States effectively take upon binding obligations thus giving up a part of their sovereign 
power.101 Therefore, policy arguments are always tightly linked to questions related to FDI. 
3.5.1. Reciprocity 
Probably the most common criticism of treaty shopping is that it breaches the principle of 
reciprocity.102 Investment treaties, especially bilateral ones, purport to establish mutual 
rights and obligations among contracting States.103 In most treaties the ideal of reciprocity 
in promotion and protection of investments is expressly stipulated in their titles and/or 
preambles. Treaty shopping runs counter to this principle by giving corporations with no 
substantial ties to a contracting State the possibility to gain favourable treaty protections 
                                                 
101 Thaliath Joseph, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties and Sovereignty: An Analysis with Respect to International 
Investment Law' [2016] 5(2) Christ University Law Journal 3 and Reinicke Wolfgang, 'Global Public Policy' 
[1997] 76(6) Foreign Affairs. It has been said that IIAs "rob the states of their sovereign immunity" making 
them vulnerable to legal claims by foreign investors, alleging breach in the promised commitments. See also 
Paulsson Jan, 'The Power of States to Make Meaningful Promises to Foreigners' [2010] 1(2) Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 341–352. 
102 Lee John (n 6) 358; van Oss and Knottnerus (n 33) 11. 
103 Sornarajah M., The International Law on Foreign Investment (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 8; 
Mclachlan Campbell, Shore Laurence and Weiniger Matthew, International Investment Arbitration  
(2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007). 
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even though its real home State may not be willing to reciprocate the gesture.104 Treaty 
Shoppers thus gain protection "for free" because their home State does not guarantee the 
same standards of protection to the investors of the host State. Such corporations are 
sometimes critically denounced as "corporations of convenience" or "free riders", and the 
host States at the receiving end of this behaviour often wish to deny their access to 
investment arbitration due to lacking ties and reciprocity.105  
The reciprocity can also be infringed in a situation where corporate restructuring is used to 
internationalise a domestic dispute.106 Local investors may benefit from investment 
protection offered only to foreign investors by channelling investments through other States. 
Consequently, nationals of the host state can create a scenario where "a company is legally 
that of a contracting state (home state), while financially it is that of the host State"107 and 
open the door to investment treaty claims against their country of origin.108 This scheme can 
be seen contrary to the character and spirit of the BITs and the very purpose of ISDS. First 
of all, the investment protection regime is inherently designed for the State to attract foreign 
capital,109 so the use of international investment arbitration to settle de facto domestic 
disputes does not further that purpose for the host State.110 Secondly, reciprocity supposes 
that the host State ought to receive some converse benefit in return for submitting themselves 
to arbitration, which is highly improbable in cases where the dispute is essentially a wholly 
domestic matter.111  
Although the reciprocity argument is quite persuasive, it has its shortcomings. The 
considerations behind the reasoning are founded on the premise that BITs and the treaty 
benefits derived from them are always built on a pattern of true reciprocity, which should be 
reflected in the provisions of the treaty itself.112 The assumption of strict quid pro quo 
                                                 
104 Azaino Efe Uzezi, 'Nationality/Treaty Shopping: Can Host Countries Sift the Wheat from the 
Chaff?' [2013] CAR 16 CEPMLP Annual Review, 10. 
105 Sornarajah (n 103) 8; Schreuer 'Nationality of Investors' (n 158) 524. 
106 Lee John (n 6) 359. 
107 Azaino (n 104) 11.  
108 Interesting question regarding this issue is whether granting direct access to arbitration under an IIA could 
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States' [2010] 104(2) American Journal of International Law 179. 
110 Lee John (n 6) 359.  
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underlying all investment treaties may not always be true.113 First, there is no guarantee that 
the underlying balance of the treaty benefits is a fair one. An IIA may be biased in favour of 
the country that has better bargaining power, usually being the economically more powerful 
country.114 Therefore, infringing the principle reciprocity does not necessarily mean that a 
"fair" contractual balance has become "unfair". It is the negotiated balance that is being 
distorted, no matter what the actual fairness credentials of this balance are.115 
Secondly, defenders of corporate nationality planning have argued that although the notions 
of mutuality and reciprocity do exist in investment agreements, they do not work in the same 
manner as in classical reciprocal State agreements.116 The difference can be found at the 
structural level; instead of providing a mutual exchange of privileges, IIAs set accepted 
standards for the unilateral conduct of the host State and assume that the interests of States 
and investors are mutually compatible, even reinforcing.117 IIAs aim to facilitate the 
prosperity "flowing from the long-term commitment of resources by the foreign investor 
under the territorial sovereignty of the host state" which could be seen as a joint ambition of 
States and investors.118 Hence, if we accept the presumption that the primary purpose of IIAs 
is to create a favourable climate to attract foreign capital, it should not even matter from 
which foreign country the capital comes from.119 From this point of view, the lack of strict 
reciprocity is not detrimental to the integrity of the investment law system. 
3.5.2. State Consent 
Another often pleaded argument against treaty shopping is related to State consent. All 
investment treaties constrain sovereignty of State. When a State enters into an IIA it actually 
limits its own rights over "the intrusive process of foreign investment" within its sovereign 
                                                 
113 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 51) 20. 
114 Avi–Yonah (n 112); see also Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 42–49. 
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territory.120 Thus, in order to be bound by treaty obligations, State must have validly 
consented to it. The legitimacy of the investment protection system is founded upon consent 
the State parties have expressed in the IIAs and therefore it is important to evaluate the 
concept of treaty shopping from this perspective.121  
The historical background of the investment protection regime and the sudden growth of 
BITs are relevant factors in this argumentation. At that time of concluding numerous BITs, 
the phenomenon of treaty shopping was nearly unknown, or at least it occurred on a much 
smaller scale. The incentive to gain better investment protection via corporate restructuring 
emerged along with the selection of BITs to choose from. Thus, it can be argued that when 
States bound themselves to IIAs – and consequently consented to protect foreign investors 
and to resolve investment disputes in arbitration – they were not fully, if at all, aware of the 
future consequences of the growing treaty shopping trend.122 Furthermore, before the mid-
1990s there were only few investment arbitration decisions from which States could seek 
guidance regarding how IIAs should be interpreted.123 At the time of signing, States may 
have been blissfully unaware of the consequences of broad treaty language that enables 
treaty shopping. Can we derive State consent to the present-day situation from their initial 
consent, when circumstances have changed so fundamentally? The existence of State 
consent to treaty shopping is thus exposed to a challenge. 
Interestingly, State consent can be used also as a justification to allow treaty shopping. If we 
follow a strictly formal approach, the wide scope and loose terminology of many BITs 
indicates that States have given their blessing to this course of action.124 This reasoning has 
its merits; States as sovereign entities have the power to negotiate and consent to such 
investment treaties as they find useful or necessary. Not only are the States free to decide 
whether to conclude a treaty in the first place, but they are also free to negotiate its terms, 
broad or narrow.125 Consistent State practice in wording and overall design of BITs, 
including the definitions that allow treaty shopping, supports the notion that States do not 
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stand against the current praxis.126 Moreover, extending State consent to a slightly wider 
range of investors is technically not in contradiction with the IIAs ultimate goal to attract 
foreign investments and thus with the underlying motivation of the given consent. 
However, the issue of ignorant consent may be real for some developing countries.127 This 
notion is illustrated for example by the recent critical reactions to treaty shopping from 
countries in Latin America and Southern Africa, who have begun to adopt a more cautious 
attitude towards IIAs.128 Many other nations have also voiced similar criticism and claimed 
that they were not giving well-informed consent to treaty shopping, nor did they agree to 
arbitrate the avalanche of claims brought by it.129 For example, in June 2009 the South 
African Government highlighted this point in its position paper reviewing South Africa's 
BIT policy by stating: 
"Prior to 1994, the RSA [Republic of South Africa] had no history of 
negotiating BITs and the risks posed by such treaties were not fully 
appreciated at that time. The Executive had not been fully apprised of all the 
possible consequences of BITs. While it was understood that the 
democratically elected government of the time had to demonstrate that the RSA 
was an investment friendly destination, the impact of BITs on future policies 
were not critically evaluated. As a result the Executive entered into agreements 
that were heavily stacked in favour of investors without the necessary 
safeguards to preserve flexibility in a number of critical policy areas."130 
The same argument has been also used in the context of the substantive provisions of BITs. 
Some scholars have suggested that IIAs ought to be reformed to correspond the modern 
world because they were drafted in different social, economic and political circumstances.131 
Nonetheless, the root of this criticism should rather be addressed by renegotiating the 
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balance of the rights and obligations in the substantive parts of IIAs instead of restricting 
corporate nationality planning.132  
3.5.3. Other Objections  
Two additional arguments have come up with respect to the opposition to treaty shopping. 
The arguments are linked to notions of sustainable development and governance gap.133 Both 
of the objections are regularly brought up by States in respect to treaty shopping. However, 
it should be noted that they actually concern international investment law system as a whole, 
and thus are not per se criticism towards the treaty shopping phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
treaty shopping can operate as an exacerbating factor and it is important to understand its 
role in these challenges. 
Sustainable Development 
It has been submitted that treaty shopping practice can adversely effect on the implied goal 
of many BITs to encourage the host State's sustainable development.134 Recent 
developments indicate that sustainable development features are starting to play a more 
prominent role in international investment policies. While still not common, these elements 
are meant to ensure that the IIA does not interfere with, but instead contributes to, States' 
sustainable development agenda to promote economic growth and the positive 
environmental and social impacts of investment.135 
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The first way treaty shopping could obstruct the goals of sustainable development is by 
exposing States to additional investment claims.136 This is an obvious consequence of the 
fact that treaty shopping expands the group of privileged investors entitled to protection 
under the IIA in question. Even if the arbitral tribunal eventually denies jurisdiction, litigious 
Treaty Shoppers can force States to invest their resources in high arbitration costs.137 Money 
from the State Treasury spent to defend investment claims (or possible damage awards) 
might then be missing from the implementation of policies consistent with sustainable 
development.138 
The second threat that treaty shopping practice might pose to sustainable development is 
related to balancing investor's rights and obligations in IIAs, namely corporate social 
responsibility.139  International law, for the time being, does not impose any direct140 legal 
obligations upon corporations.141 Nothing prevents States from concluding IIAs containing 
such obligations, but the risk is that government regulation of companies based on 
sustainable development considerations (e.g. human rights or environmental criteria) may 
be undermined by treaty shopping when investors opt for "treaty havens" that abstain from 
including provisions of this kind.142 Following this logic, the phenomenon of treaty shopping 
could discourage governmental efforts to include sustainable development stipulations in 
their investment treaties.143 
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Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard' [2006] 55(3) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 576–577. From human rights perspective see Dumberry Patrick 
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Treaties?' in Sauvant Karl (ed), 4 Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012 (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 569-600. 
141 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary–General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of 
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (9 February 2007) para 44. 
142 Muchlinski (n 68) 22; Lee John (n 6) 361. 
143 Peterson Luke, 'Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the role of human rights law 
within investor–state arbitration' [2009] Rights & Democracy (International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development) 15; van Os and Knottnerus (n 33) 12. 
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Although both arguments are essentially consistent, they seem rather one-sided and the 
connection to treaty shopping is distant. The global community is increasingly aware of the 
environment, human rights and other aspects of sustainable development; a responsible 
image has become a corporate asset. Therefore, corporations do not necessarily desire to opt 
for the most lenient provisions. Besides, arguably all investments have a positive effect on 
State's development. In particular to developing countries, foreign investment is critical to 
achieve needed economic growth to improve the welfare of their populations and to meet 
their basic needs in a sustainable manner.144 Of course this requires that the Treaty Shopper 
actually brings capital into the country rather than planting nothing more than a "mailbox". 
Governance Gap 
Unsatisfied States have also suggested that treaty shopping exacerbates the phenomenon of 
governance gap, or more familiarly known as "regulatory chill", which implies that 
governments may refrain from adopting legitimate domestic regulatory changes, for e.g. the 
environment, natural resources or health, due to the threat of being dragged into investor-
state arbitration.145 The phenomenon concerns the entire system of international investment 
because IIAs, unlike many other international instruments, grant investors directly 
enforceable procedural rights and access to dispute resolution mechanisms (arbitration 
without privity).146 Consequently, States fear that if they introduce new domestic legislation 
it may adversely affect the financial value of a foreign investment and thus expose them to 
investor claims.147  
The argument, when used to campaign against treaty shopping, lies open to criticism. First, 
the effect of regulatory chill is difficult to prove or disprove. There are opposing views over 
the causal link between regulatory chill and the threat of investment arbitration.148 Moreover, 
                                                 
144 United Nations Conference on Environment & Development (UNCED), Agenda 21: Programme of Action 
for Sustainable Development (United Nations Sustainable Development 1992) para 2.23. 
145 Tietje, Christian and Baetens Freya, 'The Impact of Investor–State–Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership', Study prepared for: Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (2014) 9; Van Os and Knottnerus (n 
33) 12–13. 
146 In investment arbitration the parties' arbitration agreement is based on a unilateral offer by contracting States 
expressed in IIAs. This peculiar characteristic of ISDS has provoked discussion especially in relation to States' 
counterclaims against claimant investor. For more about the topic see e.g. Paulsson Jan, 'Arbitration Without 
Privity' [1995] 10(2) ICSID Review 232–257. 
147 Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 62. 
148 For opinion against see e.g. Schill Stephan, 'Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to 
Mitigate Climate Change?' [2007] 24(5) Journal of International Arbitration 469–477. For opinion 
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Chill in the Face of Litigious Heat?' [2013] 3(1) Western Journal of Legal Studies. 
34 
 
there is no reliable method to measure this relation, as regulators may have multiple motives 
to withdraw from a planned domestic regulatory measure. Even if the looming threat of 
investment claims caused a State to surrender legislative action, it is not likely to publicly 
admit this.149 Second, as mentioned above, the governance gap (if it exists) does not derive 
directly from treaty shopping but rather is connected to the ISDS mechanism.150 In spite of 
that, treaty shopping can potentially aggravate the chilling effect as it increases the number 
of potential investment claims that may be brought as a counterattack to State measures. 
In conclusion, States have raised various concerns when arguing against treaty shopping. 
Some points are more substantiated than others, but none of them seems persuasive enough 
to justify prohibition of treaty shopping altogether.  
3.6. Importance of Nationality in Treaty Shopping Framework 
Treaty shopping, as we see later in the case analyses, revolves heavily around the notion of 
"nationality". Simply put, treaty shopping is all about having the right nationality at the right 
time. The meaning of the term for the purposes of international investment law deviates from 
that of public international law.151 Particularly pertaining to multinational corporate 
investors, the concept of nationality offers, at least prima facie, flexibility that may be 
utilised and also exploited when structuring foreign investments.152 An investor's nationality 
is a substantial precondition for treaty shopping, and also a source of controversy. 
                                                 
149 For example, it has been speculated that Canada retreated from its planned tobacco restrictions in both 1994 
and 2001 because of threats from the tobacco industry to bring actions under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. However, 
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(8 July 2016). 
150 Côté, Christine, 'A chilling effect? The impact of international investment agreements on national regulatory 
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the treatment of an individual investor in the context of a particular license or permit granted by government 
officials. 
151 In public international law, the practice related to determining nationality has mostly developed in the 
context of diplomatic protection. In the Nottebohm case, the ICJ held that there must be a real connection 
between the State and the national. In the international investment law sphere, there is not any general 
requirement for a real connection when defining a national. In fact, investment treaties typically impose only 
a place of incorporation requirement to gain nationality. Investors can rather easily satisfy this requirement 
without having an economic connection to the State, which leaves host States vulnerable to treaty shopping 
practices.  
152 ILA German Branch / Working Group (n 48). 
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Understanding the concept of nationality and its importance in investment law is crucial in 
order to fully examine the issues of this research. In fact, nationality has multiple functions 
when it comes to protecting foreign investments. The vast majority of investment law's 
substantive and procedural guarantees are contained in IIAs.153 These standards apply to a 
limited group of investors, generally nationals of each State party to the particular IIA.154 
The State is only obliged to observe special treatment in favour of certain privileged persons 
and legal entities. Another reason why an investor's nationality matters is because the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is determined, among other things, by the claimant's 
nationality.155 Particularly, if the host state has given its consent to arbitration through an 
investment treaty, that consent cannot be extended to nationals of a state that is not a 
contracting party.156 Finally, nationality can be a prerequisite for a State to exercise 
diplomatic protection.157 Hence, the investor seeking protection under a treaty must 
demonstrate that it is a national of the contracting State.158 Nationality is the most important 
tool for an investor who is planning to treaty shop. But what kind of connection to the home 
state must the investor show in order to gain the benefits of the IIA? This is where the 
individual treaty comes into play. 
Almost every IIA contains a specific provision defining the term investor159 and, although 
the specific criteria may vary, the definition is generally derived from the concept of 
nationality.160 There is no internationally settled definition of investor but instead the states 
are free to assert their own interpretations of the term in their individual IIAs. By doing so 
the states can limit the scope of the investment protections offered in other parts of the IIA 
as only those investors who fall within the definition will be eligible for the benefits and 
protections of the treaty.161 In other words, the definition of the term investor is critical to 
                                                 
153  ILA German Branch / Working Group (n 48) 52. See also 1.2 of this Study. 
154 McIlwrath and Savage (n 60) 372; Spiermann Ole, 'Individual Rights, State Interests and the Power to Waive 
ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties' [2004] 20(2) Arbitration International 179. 
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156 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 51) 47 and Collins (n 8) 79−80.  
157 Acconci Pia, 'Determining the Internationally Relevant Link between a State and a Corporate Investor: 
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159 Another provision found in nearly all IIAs is the definition of Investment that lays out the characteristics of 
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160 ILA German Branch / Working Group (n 48) 11 and Martin Antoine 'Disputes, Nationality and Corporate 
Veil: Some Insights from Tokios Tokelés and TSA Spectrum De Argentina' [2011] 8(1) Transnational 
Dispute Management 1–17. 
161 Collins David, An Introduction to International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) 74. 
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determining the scope of an investment treaty.162 Therefore, whether the investor holds a 
specific nationality is a fundamental question that must be answered before proceeding with 
the substantive investment issues. 
At first glance, it might not seem complicated to determine if there is such legal bond 
between an investor and a state that would constitute nationality. However, in today's 
globalised economy, multinational corporations are not uncommon and even smaller legal 
entities may have complex organisational structures that make tracing the legal bond 
challenging. Investments can be channelled through multiple entities in different 
jurisdictions and owned by nationals of different countries.163 Especially in the field of 
international investment and trade, nationality is often deemed a fact of coincidence or 
convenience rather than a true bond to a state.164   
3.6.1. How to Determine Corporate Investor's Nationality 
IIAs tend to use three nationality tests: a) the incorporation test, b) siège social (also known 
as the seat test) or c) the control test.165 In some cases all three of these are used together or 
they might be combined with other factors to create a higher threshold for corporate 
nationality.166 Yet another approach refrains from including a precise definition in the treaty 
provisions and instead refers to the conditions prescribed by the domestic law of the home 
State where the juridical person was incorporated.167 As nationality is the key facilitator of 
treaty shopping, it is useful to understand different methods to define eligible investors. In 
this Subsection, I will introduce the most commonly used criteria and analyse the strengths 
and weaknesses of each approach from a treaty shopping perspective. 
                                                 
162 Professor Schreuer has pointed out an interesting paradox regarding investor's nationality. With respect to 
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a) Place of Incorporation 
The so-called incorporation theory is the most frequently used method to determine an 
investor's nationality. It is also the most relevant in the treaty shopping framework as it sets 
the lowest possible threshold to qualify as an investor. According to this approach, juridical 
persons that are incorporated or constituted in accordance with the laws of a particular State 
are considered to be nationals of that State.168 Consequently, the incorporation test covers 
investors that are established and organised according to the relevant national legislation. No 
additional requirements apply, so the corporation can be owned by nationals of a third State 
or even nationals of the host State itself. Furthermore, the test does not oblige the corporation 
to exercise any real economic activity in the contracting State, which means that "mailbox" 
or "shell" companies are deemed to be investors as well, provided that the formal 
prerequisites are met.169 
As an example, the Energy Charter Treaty (hereafter ECT) Article 1 (7) (a) (ii) defines 
investor with respect to a Contracting Party to include:  “a company or other organization 
organized in accordance with the law applicable in that Contracting Party”.170  
The mere incorporation requirement is the most liberal approach, and one of the chief 
advantages associated with determining investor status in this manner is its simplicity, 
flexibility and predictability.171 Identifying the State under whose laws a legal entity is 
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force April 16, 1998). See also Energy Charter Secretariat, 'The Energy Charter Treaty: A Reader’s Guide' 
[2002]. 
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organised is, in most cases, fairly straightforward operation.172 Moreover, linking nationality 
with the State of incorporation is more likely to result in consistent nationality over the life 
of the investment as the place of incorporation is generally permanent or at least not easily 
changed.173 There should be no major pitfalls with regard to the confirmation of investor's 
nationality. From the investor's perspective, the test of incorporation is fairly easy to satisfy 
and thus it offers the widest access to treaty benefits. Accordingly, treaties that rely only on 
the incorporation criteria are the easiest to gain access to for treaty shopping purposes. Yet 
another benefit of this method is that it can help to create a more stable investment 
environment, which is valuable for both States and investors.174 A clear-cut requirement that 
is not depended on other factors than lawful establishment of a judicial person reduces the 
risk that the treaty protections under an IIA will be either gained or lost as a result of changes 
in ownership structure for instance.175 
Nationality constructed based solely on incorporation has its deficiencies. There is no 
guarantee that the investor actually engages in economic activity or has any other genuine 
link to the incorporation-state. Thus it exposes states to potentially negative treaty shopping 
practises.176 The legal entity may be wholly owned or controlled by nationals of a third State, 
or it might be a mailbox company that does not generate any economic benefits in the host 
State.177 For this reason some States have objected defining nationality strictly on 
incorporation, even if the formal requirements set by the IIA and the national legislation 
were satisfied. Many arbitral tribunals have concluded that the incorporation test laid down 
in the IIA does not authorise them to examine the true nature of the investor's nationality nor 
require them to do so.178  
However, the incorporation test is sufficient if a State is willing to grant treaty benefits and 
protection to investor-corporations irrespective of the nationality of individuals who 
ultimately own or manage them.179 
                                                 
172 ibid. 
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b) Siège Social  
Some States, more frequently civil law countries, have adopted the Siège social theory, also 
commonly known as the seat theory.180 The seat theory has the potential to deter treaty 
shopping because it requires greater commitment from the investor.181 The theory rests upon 
the place where the effective management is located.182 The "effective management"183 most 
commonly refers to the centre of administration, the place where "the fundamental decisions 
of the company's management are actually executed into valid and externally focused 
management acts".184 A statutory seat would not suffice to meet this criterion, nor would a 
mere head office even though the latter may be referred to as a "seat" too.185 Accordingly 
the siège social theory demands more genuine link between the legal entity and the country 
of nationality than the incorporation theory introduced above.186  
For instance, according to Art 1 (2) of the BIT between the People's Republic of China and 
the Federal Republic of Germany the term "investor" means: 
"(a) in respect of the Federal Republic of Germany:  
- any juridical person as well as any commercial or other company or 
association with or without legal personality having its seat in the territory of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, irrespective of whether or not its activities 
are directed at profit;  
(b) in respect of the People’s Republic of China:  
- economic entities, including companies, corporations, associations, 
partnerships and other organizations, incorporated and constituted under the 
laws and regulations of and with their seats in the People’s Republic of China, 
                                                 
180 It is worth mentioning that some IIAs also use other terms such as main office or residence to refer to the 
same theory. See Perkams Markus, 'The Determination of Nationality of Investors in International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs)—Taking Stock of the Criteria Used in Modern Investment Law' in ILA German Branch, 
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181 Lee John (n 6) 365. 
182 Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 75; Schreuer 'Nationality of Investors' (n 158) 521. 
183 Expression "effective management" as the requirement for nationality has caused its share of problems as 
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irrespective of whether or not for profit and whether their liabilities are limited 
or not" 187 
The seat test is more "treaty shopping proof" than mere incorporation as the investor must 
show a more significant economic relation to the home State.188 However, compared to the 
theory presented above, the seat theory is not as straightforward since specifying the seat of 
a multinational corporation may be a troublesome exercise.189 Generally speaking, it is still 
a more functional and far simpler analysis than investigating the origins of the person(s) 
controlling the company. 
c) Control Theory   
The final criterion of nationality examined in this section is the control test, also known as 
the ownership test. It means that a juridical person is deemed to be an investor of that State 
whose nationals own or control it.190 Instead of looking into the nature of the legal entity 
itself, the nationality of person(s) behind it is definitive. In this regard, the corporation is 
assumed to be more an investment vehicle than an actual independent investor. The control 
theory is not as widely used as the two other tests and actually it is, in most cases, combined 
with other nationality indicators.191  
Exercise of control, along with limiting criteria, is adopted in the BIT between the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands and the Argentine Republic. Under Art (1) (b) (iii) of the treaty the term 
"investor" shall comprise with regard to either Contracting Party: 
"[L]egal persons, wherever located, controlled, directly or indirectly, by 
nationals of that Contracting Party"192 
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On the positive side, the control test, whether alone or consolidated with other factors, has 
the benefit of looking into "substance over form" by examining genuine economic links.193 
Thus, it can hinder potential attempts to abuse corporate restructuring and essentially 
functions in a similar manner to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.194 
The control-focused approach also has its drawbacks. First, legal entities making 
international investments oftentimes involve complex holding structures and may have 
several layers of ownership, which makes it difficult to identify the nationality of the true 
controllers.195 In addition, it raises the question of the nature of the "control" required. That 
is whether the investor must show actual exercise of control (factual control) or legal ability 
to control (legal control) and whether we should examine the nationality of the ultimate 
controller (the final link in the chain) or the initial layers of control.196 For example, if the 
term is defined broadly to include both direct and indirect control, the host State may be 
exposed to concurrent or multiple proceedings concerning the same investment.197 Finally, 
there is a high risk that the nationality could change over the lifetime of the investment, 
especially in the case of limited companies as shares are typically freely transferable.198 The 
exposure to frequent changes in nationality status is one of the main reasons why the control 
theory is often bundled with other nationality standards.  
d) Combined Factors 
The final commonly used approach to set limits on investor's nationality is to cumulatively 
use some or all three theories analysed above. Combination might also include additional 
elements, such as "actually doing business" or "actual business activities" in the territory of 
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the home State.199 For example Art. 1 of the BIT between Canada and the Republic of Peru 
goes as follows:  
"[E]nterprise of a Party means an enterprise constituted or organized under 
the law of a Party, and a branch located in the territory of a Party and carrying 
out business activities there".200 
Cumulative usage of several criteria can help to narrow the scope of the treaty protection to 
only those corporations that have real and continuous economic ties to the home State, so it 
is arguably the most effective method for States that wish to curb treaty shopping.201 
However, the obvious consequence is that it is also the most complicated approach in 
practice.  
To conclude, the investor's origins matters greatly for the purposes international investment 
law in general. It is the dominant factor with regards to the applicability of an IIA ratione 
personae. Yet there are multiple approaches to define who is a national of a certain State and 
thus privileged to enjoy the benefits it entails. A concept that seems so simple at first has 
provoked a lot of discussion and confusion among commentators and arbitral tribunals.  In 
regard to the research questions of this Study, the definition of nationality, or more precisely 
investor status, seems to be a primary enabler of treaty shopping practices but perhaps also 
a part of the solution to control the adverse effects of such activity. 
Now that we have a general idea what treaty shopping is, how it works and what kind of 
consequences it might bear, we can move ahead to the case studies where arbitral tribunals 
have undertaken to draw the line between permissible and prohibited treaty shopping 
practice.  
 
       
                                                 
199 UNCTAD 'Scope and Definition' (n 54) 15; Thorn and Doucleff (n 168) 8–9; Tekin (n 166) para 10. 
200 Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Canada–Peru BIT), 14 November 2006 (entered into force 20 June 2007). See also Art. 1(3)(c) of the Chile-
Finland BIT (1993). 
201 Tekin (n 166) para 10. 
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4. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND ABUSIVE 
TREATY SHOPPING – ANALYSIS THROUGH CASE STUDIES 
In this Chapter, I will highlight some of the most influential arbitral cases regarding treaty 
shopping in order to draw general conclusions as to when treaty shopping is allowed and 
when it becomes prohibited. The different approaches and reasoning in the case law illustrate 
how controversial the issue is, for not even international tribunals have found common 
ground on the permissibility of treaty shopping behaviour. Divergent jurisprudence has 
created great uncertainty about the scope of legitimate corporate nationality planning in 
investor-State arbitration. The storm of controversy surrounding treaty shopping 
phenomenon seems to be gathering force, and thus far arbitral tribunals have been unable to 
satisfy the need for legal certainty. 
As stability and predictability are key premises for a viable investment system, the unsettled 
case law emphasises existing insecurity and is potentially harmful for the entire flow of FDI. 
Both States and investors should be able to predict the limits of their rights in order to 
properly contribute to investment activities. It must be noted that when determining 
appropriate limits for treaty shopping, there are many forms of it, some of which are more 
objectionable than others. That is understandably part of the explanation for inconsistent 
arbitral decisions. However, significant discrepancies occur among similar cases too, which 
has caused major confusion. 
In spite of split opinions, some identifiable trends have emerged. In the following Sections, 
I will divide these approaches into two main categories: the permissive response and the 
prohibitive response. Under each Section, I will provide a summary of the leading cases and 
analyse the reasoning behind arbitrators' decision. To conclude, I will draw some common 
guidelines as to where to place the line between acceptable and unacceptable treaty 
shopping.  
4.1. Treaty Interpretation – General Principles 
In order to be fully able to assess arbitral awards concerning treaty shopping, it is necessary 
to briefly review the general approaches to investment treaty interpretation. As international 
investment law is part of public international law, the starting point of interpreting IIAs is 
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that of interpretation of international treaties in general.202 Such rules are contained in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter VCLT).203 In fact, investment tribunals 
invariably begin their interpretation by invoking Article 31 of VCLT, according to which: 
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."204 
Two main approaches have emerged from this phrasing: the textual and the teleological 
interpretation.205 Interpreting IIA provisions in treaty shopping cases, as we can see in the 
upcoming Sections, divides similarly. Namely, some tribunals have confined themselves 
strictly to the wording of the applicable IIA, while others have gone beyond the treaty text 
in search of an interpretation consistent with the objective and purpose of the treaty.  
According to the textual approach, treaty interpretation should be primarily based on the 
actual terms expressed in the IIA. The wording of the IIA is the main source in determining 
the Contracting States' intention, and the tribunal cannot deviate from what the parties have 
agreed.206 Thus, when interpreting treaty text, the tribunal tries to give the words, as they are 
used in the treaty context, their "ordinary meaning".207 Consequently, the textual approach 
leaves no room for considerations beyond the wording of the IIA, even if the outcome is 
incompatible with the spirit of the treaty.  
By contrast, the tribunals employing teleological interpretation tend to emphasise the 
underlying objective and purpose of the treaty.208 The teleological approach may better 
                                                 
202 Weeramantry Romesh, Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Chapter 1. 
203 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. 
204 Schreuer Christoph, 'Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration' in 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Brill Nijhoff 2010) 129. 
205 Koskenniemi Martti, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 333. However, the treaty interpretation by investment tribunals has evoked strong 
critique as well. Some scholars are concerned about the various nuances in the interpretation methods of 
investment tribunals, which may lead to (even more) fragmented case law and damage the predictability and 
stability of international investment. See e.g.  Pauwelyn Joost and Elsig Manfred, 'The Politics of Treaty 
Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International Tribunals' in Dunoff Jeffrey and Pollack 
Mark (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the 
Art (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
206 De Figueiredo Roberto, 'Interpreting Investment Treaties' (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 21 October 2014). 
Available at: http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/10/21/interpreting-investment-treaties/ 
(accessed 18 March 2018). 
207 Pauwelyn and Elsig (n 205) 452. For arbitral decision employing the textual interpretation see e.g. Salini 
Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (9 November 2004). 
208 The objective and purpose of the treaty are often found in the preamble. In the context of BITs, this 
interpretation generally leads to an interpretation that is more favourable to investor. This investor friendly 
tendency was recognised by, for example, the Noble Ventures tribunal. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, 
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reflect the Contracting States' original intentions, but it also risks the most fragmentation and 
conflict among tribunals, as such interpretation is inevitably value-based and gives the 
arbitrators great leeway.209 In treaty shopping cases, the teleological interpretation is 
repeatedly paired with the good faith (or, more accurately, its derivative, abuse of process) 
argument.210 This combination has played a significant role in decisions condemning treaty 
shopping. 
Next I will elaborate on treaty shopping case law. Here, the tribunal's choice of interpretation 
has proven to be decisive with regards to the permissibility of the phenomenon. 
Consequently, the cases are systematised in accordance with the textual versus teleological 
approach separation. As of yet, it is not possible to determine which approach will prevail. 
While newer cases have increasingly relied on good faith considerations, support for the 
formal reading of the treaty text remains strong. 
4.2. Permissive Approaches: Staying Within the Limits of the Treaty  
The permissive approach covers cases in which arbitral tribunals accepted treaty shopping 
via restructuring as a lawful action within the limits of the IIA text. Several investment 
tribunals have rejected requests by State-respondents to look beyond the wording of the 
applicable IIA for limits on corporate nationality planning. In each instance, the tribunal took 
a consent-oriented stand and noted that the explicit terms of the applicable treaty provided 
the necessary and adequate criteria for determining corporate nationality, namely the place 
of incorporation.211 In other words, the approach is strictly based on a formal reading of the 
treaty text emphasizing the freedom of States to set limits, if they wish to do so, on treaty 
shopping when they negotiate the IIA in question.  
4.2.1. Round-Tripping – Case of Tokios Tokelès and Rompetrol 
The analysis starts with cases involving so-called "round-tripping", which refers to an 
arrangement whereby an investor, who is a national of the host State, owns or controls a 
                                                 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award (12 October 2005) para 52. However, with regards to treaty shopping 
cases, it seems that the effect is the opposite; reference to the objective and purpose of the applicable IIA often 
leads to State-friendly interpretation since Treaty Shoppers with no (or very little) business activity in the host 
State rarely promote the economy of that State. 
209 Pauwelyn and Elsig (n 205) 453. For further critique on the teleological approach see ILA German 
Branch / Working Group (n 48) 52. 
210 For more discussion about the status of good faith principle in international investment law see Đajićć 
Sanja, 'Mapping the Good Faith Principle in International Investment Arbitration: Assessment of Its 
Substantive and Procedural Value' [2012] 46(3) Proceedings of Novi Sad Faculty of Law 207–233; Ponce and 
Cevallos (n 18). 
211 Feldman (n 166) 285. 
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legal entity incorporated in another State that has signed an IIA with the host State.212 In 
these instances States have argued that an investor brings domestic investment claims against 
its own State of nationality via a formally international entity. 
Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine 
To begin with an ICSID case, Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine, was one the very first substantive 
considerations of treaty shopping in investment jurisprudence.213 The case is the most 
compelling example of the formalistic interpretation of an investor's nationality. The 
Claimant, Tokios Tokelès, was a publishing company incorporated in Lithuania that accused 
the Ukrainian government of engaging in series of actions that amounted to mistreatment of 
its investment in Ukraine, a wholly owned subsidiary called Taki Spravy.214 The Claimant 
brought action against the host State under the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT.215 A dispute arose 
over jurisdiction when Ukraine, the Respondent, argued that the Claimant was not a "genuine 
entity" of Lithuania because it was owned and controlled predominantly by Ukrainian 
nationals: 99 per cent of the capital of Tokios Tokelès and two thirds of its management 
were of Ukrainian origin.216 Consequently, allowing the Claimant to pursue the claim would 
be tantamount to allowing Ukrainian nationals to pursue international arbitration against 
their own government, which the Respondent argued would contravene the international 
character of BITs and the ICSID Convention.217 In fact, the Respondent did not contest that 
Tokios Tokelès was de jure Lithuanian under the BIT as the treaty only required 
incorporation. Nonetheless, the Respondent requested the tribunal to "pierce the corporate 
veil" and find that it had no jurisdiction ratione personae in this case.218 As for the Claimant, 
                                                 
212 The term is used for example in Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 102–108. 
213 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (29 April 2004); Ascensio 
Hervé, 'Abuse of Process in International Investment Arbitration' [2014] 13(4) Chinese Journal of International 
Law 771; Skinner et al. (n 59) 277. 
214 Gupta Vidushi, 'Exclusion From Within the Ambit of a Protected Investor, a Fair Price to Pay for the Act 
of Abusive Treaty Shopping?' [2014] 11(1) Transnational Dispute Management 12; Martin 
Antoine, 'International Investment Disputes, Nationality and Corporate Veil: Some Insights From Tokios 
Tokelés and TSA Spectrum de Argentina' [2011] 8(1) Transnational Dispute Management 2; Wisner and 
Gallus (n 163) 942. 
215 Art 1 (2) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of 
Ukraine for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investment (Ukraine-Lithuania BIT), 8 February 1994 
(entered into force 6 March 1995).  
216 Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, Decision (n 213) para 21. 
217 ibid para 22. “The Convention is designed to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between States 
and nationals of other States. It is not meant for disputes between States and their own nationals.” Schreuer 
Christoph, The ICSID Convention - A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2001) 690. See also Section 
2.3 of this Study. 
218 ibid para 23. 
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it argued that the incorporation test was quite straightforward and it had met the applicable 
criteria. 
The tribunal's decision was split two-to-one in favour of the Claimant. Uncommonly, it was 
the presiding arbitrator, Professor Prosper Weil, who strongly dissented and eventually even 
resigned his position in protest of the decision to accept jurisdiction.219 The majority adopted 
a narrow consent-oriented reading of the BIT.220 The arbitrators emphasised that 
"Contracting Parties are free to define their consent to jurisdiction in terms that are broad 
or narrow; they may employ a control-test or reserve the right to deny treaty protection to 
claimants who otherwise would have recourse under the BIT. Once that consent is defined, 
however, tribunals should give effect to it, unless doing so would allow the Convention to 
be used for purposes for which it clearly was not intended."221 Therefore, as the Claimant 
prima facie fulfilled the nationality requirement, and the majority of the tribunal refused to 
limit the scope of the BIT in the absence of a treaty provision requiring them to do so. 
As to the Respondent's request to "pierce the corporate veil", the majority reviewed the 
International Court of Justice's (ICJ) reasoning in the case Barcelona Traction222 and held 
that "none of the Claimant’s conduct with respect to its status as an entity of Lithuania 
constitutes an abuse of legal personality".223 Even though the tribunal only relied on the IIA's 
wording and declined to deeper evaluate the true nature of the Claimant's corporate structure, 
one may draw a conclusion, a contrario, that it would be possible to disregard the formal 
corporate structure should any fraud allegation be confirmed, and in this case it was the 
absence of such abuse that justified complete reliance on the incorporation test.224 
                                                 
219 Professor Weil was then replaced by Lord Michael Mustill and the tribunal finally rendered its award on 26 
July 2007. See Skinner et al. (n 59) 278. 
220 Tokios Tokeles, Decision (n 213) para 24; Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 103–104. The majority 
noted that Article 25 of the ICSID Convention leaves the task of defining the nationality of juridical entities to 
“the reasonable discretion of the Contracting Parties” and therefore looked strictly at the ordinary meaning of 
the BIT, which required mere incorporation in order for a company to qualify as an investor. 
221 ibid, para 40 (emphasis added). 
222 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), International Court of Justice, 
Judgement (5 February 1970). 
223 The tribunal found that the Claimant "made no attempt whatever to conceal its national identity from the 
Respondent" and that the Claimant "manifestly did not create [Tokios Tokelès] for the purpose of gaining 
access to ICSID arbitration against Ukraine, as the enterprise was founded six years before the BIT between 
Ukraine and Lithuania entered into force". Tokios Tokeles, Decision (n 213) para 56.  
224 Ascensio (n 213) 771–772 and Martin (n 160) 6. 
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As mentioned, "the philosophy of the Decision" triggered profound disagreement by 
Professor Weil, the President of the tribunal.225 He was of the opinion that capital and 
corporation should not be mechanically separated when determining the investor's true 
nationality. Professor Weil argued that the ICSID Convention was designed to stimulate a 
larger flow of private international capital into those States that wish to attract it, and its 
scope is therefore limited to "only the genuinely international investments".226 Consequently, 
he would have construed the nationality requirement in conformity with Article 31 of the 
VCLT, according to which a treaty provision shall be interpreted "in the light of its object 
and purpose."227 As the raison d’être of the Convention was to encourage a trans-border flux 
of capital, he held that “Contrary to what the Decision maintains, when it comes to 
ascertaining the international character of an investment, the origin of the capital is relevant, 
and even decisive.”228 
The main outcome of the Tokios Tokelés case is that the States have the discretion in defining 
investors' nationality. Hence, as long as the host State has stipulated the incorporation test 
as the decisive factor, this will be respected absent an abuse of legal personality by the 
investor.229 Following this logic it seems that the origin of the capital is irrelevant; even if it 
stems from the host State itself. 
Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania 
Another case involving an investor bringing action against its own State of nationality 
through a formally foreign entity is Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania.230 In the case, 
Rompetrol Group N.V. which was a Netherlands-incorporated company, brought an ICSID 
                                                 
225 Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Weil (29 April 
2004) para 1. 
226 ibid paras 3 and 24 (emphasis in original). Para 3 is referring to the Report of the Executive Directors of the 
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229 Kjos Hege Elisabeth, 'Case Comments & Awards: Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction of 
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230 The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (18 April 2008). 
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claim against Romania under the Netherlands-Romania BIT.231 Rompetrol was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of a Swiss company, which in turn was owned and controlled by a 
Romanian national (80 per cent of shares).232 Rompetrol then set up an affiliate in Romania 
in which it held a controlling interest (51 per cent), and that affiliate owned one of the largest 
oil refineries in Romania. In 2004 the National Anti-Corruption Office of Romania 
commenced investigations relating the refinery which the Claimant considered oppressive, 
giving rise to the dispute.233 
Romania contested the tribunal's jurisdiction, pleading that regardless of the fact that the 
formal nationality requirements were indisputably met, the Claimant could not bring a claim 
under the treaty because its "real and effective" nationality was, in fact, that of the respondent 
State.234 The Claimant company should not be allowed to initiate international proceedings 
in what was really a domestic dispute; Rompetrol was owned and controlled by a Romanian 
citizen, had its real seat in Romania, and the origin of its funds was Romanian.235 
However, the tribunal rejected the Respondent's arguments, thereby confirming the line 
taken by the majority in Tokios Tokelès. The tribunal declined to read any additional 
requirements into the definition of "investor", and declared that: 
"Hence the question becomes simply, what did these two States themselves agree to 
of their own free will in concluding the BIT? The Tribunal therefore holds that the 
definition of national status given in The Netherlands-Romania BIT is decisive for 
the purpose of establishing its jurisdiction."236 
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Accordingly, the Claimant qualified as an investor, and the Rompetrol Group N.V. v. 
Romania decision further affirmed the literal reading of the treaty and permissive approach 
to treaty shopping. 
4.2.2. The Use of Mailbox Companies – Saluka and ADC  
The second group of cases covers situations where the investor is a so-called "mailbox"237 
company and the investor actually owning or controlling the investment is a national of a 
third State.238 These disputes are thus international by nature, but States have nevertheless 
objected the jurisdiction ratione personae, pleading that without real economic connection 
the investor should not benefit from the treaty protection either.  
Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic  
In Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic239 the dispute arose out of the 
reorganisation and privatisation of the Czech banking system. Nomura Europe (an English 
subsidiary of a Japanese investment bank conglomerate Nomura Group) acquired 46 per cent 
of the shares in a Czech commercial bank Investiční a Poštovní Banka (IPB) after it was 
privatised. Subsequently, Nomura Europe transferred the relevant shares to its wholly owned 
subsidiary Saluka Investments B.V., a company established under the laws of the Netherlands 
for the sole purpose of holding Nomura’s investment in the Czech Republic.240 The 
controversies started when the Czech government extended state aid to all major banks 
excluding IPB. Saluka commenced arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules, claiming a 
violation of Article 3 (fair and equitable treatment) and Article 5 (deprivation of investment) 
of the Netherlands-Czech BIT.241  
                                                 
237 The term "mailbox company" does not have a universal definition but, for example, International Law 
Commission (ILC) characterises it as a corporation that "is controlled by nationals of another State or States 
and has no substantial business activities in the State of incorporation, and the seat of management and the 
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Diplomatic Protection, International Law Commission (2006). 
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from third States shopping into BITs more favourable than the ones their real home State has. 
239 Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL/PCA, Partial Award (17 March 2006). 
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The Czech Republic, the Respondent, challenged the tribunal's jurisdiction, asserting that 
the true investor was not Saluka but Nomura, which was not an eligible claimant under the 
BIT.242 The Respondent did not contest the fact that Saluka satisfied the incorporation test 
set out in the BIT, but instead it argued that the Claimant was nothing more than a shell for 
Nomura and thus not a bona fide investor because it had no "real and continuous links" to 
the Netherlands.243  
The tribunal followed the formal, consent-oriented approach similarly to Tokios Tokelès and 
Rompetrol, ultimately rejecting the Czech Republic’s submissions. It underlined that the 
contracting States had complete freedom to define "investor" and that it is beyond the 
tribunal's powers to import additional requirements which contracting States could 
themselves have added but which they omitted to add.244 
Nevertheless, the tribunal expressed some sympathy for the Respondent's arguments that a 
company without real economic ties to a State party to a BIT should not be entitled to invoke 
the provisions of that treaty. Further, the tribunal noted that accepting this possibility enables 
abuses of arbitral procedure and practices of treaty shopping, which can entail many 
disadvantages.245 It acknowledged the apparent closeness between Saluka and Nomura, and 
that the true beneficiary of the investment might be the latter, but stated that "the companies 
concerned have simply acted in a manner which is commonplace in the world of 
commerce."246 However, ultimately, the predominant factor that must guide the tribunal's 
exercise of its functions is the terms in which the contracting parties have agreed to establish 
the tribunal's jurisdiction.247 
ADC Affiliate Limited v. Hungary 
A similar situation arose in ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited 
v. The Republic of Hungary.248 In this case the Claimant companies, which were 
incorporated in Cyprus but ultimately controlled by Canadian entities,249 brought a claim 
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against Hungary under the Cyprus-Hungary BIT.250 The Respondent maintained that the 
Claimants were nothing but two shell companies established by Canadian investors with the 
ulterior motive to gain access to ICSID jurisdiction for nationals whose home State is not a 
contracting Party of the ICSID Convention.251 Even so, the Respondent conceded that those 
companies, in fact, had been incorporated in compliance with the laws of Cyprus and thus 
the definition of investor under the BIT was met.252 Alternatively, Hungary sought dismissal 
of jurisdiction based on a missing "genuine link" between the corporation and the State of 
its claimed nationality, which, it argued, was a “fundamental requirement of the rules of 
international law”.253 Finally, it added that, quoting the words of Professor Weil, the object 
and purpose of the ICSID Convention require consideration of the origin of the investment 
capital when deciding on the investor's nationality.254 Thus, the tribunal should pierce the 
Claimants' corporate veil. 
Again, the tribunal rejected both arguments, noting that the question of Claimants' 
nationality was "settled unambiguously" by the wording of the BIT, and therefore there was 
no room for the consideration of customary law principles of nationality.255 The government 
of Hungary could have included the requirement of a genuine link in the respective BIT, but 
it chose not to do so.256 
4.2.3. Preliminary Conclusions 
In each of the four cases analysed above, the Respondent State argued that the claim ought 
to be dismissed on account of abusive corporate restructuring by the Claimant. The tribunals 
responded to those allegations in two different ways. Firstly, the Rompetrol tribunal flatly 
rejected the policy-focused argument that the Claimant's "real and effective" nationality 
could supersede the language of the treaty. Secondly, the Tokios Tokelès, Saluka and ADC 
awards included some consideration with respect to the legitimacy of the claimant's 
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corporate activity without addressing the question under what circumstances abusive 
conduct might lead to the dismissal of claims in investor–State arbitration.257  
According to Professor Mark Feldman, the abovementioned jurisprudence reflects two key 
developments in corporate nationality planning in investment law. First, any attempt to read 
additional requirements into a BIT's definition of investor (such as "genuine connection", 
"origin of capital" and/or "real and continuous links") is likely to be unsuccessful.258 
Furthermore, the state of the law is unsettled concerning the impact, if any, that abusive 
corporate activity has on questions of jurisdiction.259 
In the following Section, I will present a different kind of approach: decisions taking a 
prohibitive stand on treaty shopping. These cases repeatedly rely on teleological 
interpretation and considerations beyond the treaty text, thus adopting a completely different 
starting point for their reasoning. One can find apparent support for the proposition that 
abusive corporate restructuring can lead to the dismissal of claims in investor-State 
arbitration. However, the decisions seem to disagree on the relevant factors that should be 
considered when drawing the line between legitimate nationality planning and abusive 
practices. 
4.3. Prohibitive Approaches: Solutions beyond the Treaty Text 
In the cases prohibiting treaty shopping, tribunals have taken upon themselves to investigate 
the true nature of investor's nationality and the intentions behind the change of nationality. 
In this quest they have routinely relied on general principles of law, particularly abuse of 
process, which can be seen as a corollary of good faith. The decisions have often boiled 
down to the timing of the corporate restructuring, but the reasoning pertaining to it has been 
inconsistent, leaving some relevant questions open to doubt. Through case law, some 
guidelines have progressively emerged. Below, I will examine three cases prohibiting treaty 
shopping. First, in the Phoenix case, the tribunal dismissed the claims on the grounds of 
                                                 
257 Feldman (n 166) 287–288. Likewise, two additional decisions that considered Respondent’s allegations of 
abusive restructuring did not clarify the circumstances under which a tribunal might be deprived of jurisdiction. 
See Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No 
ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (27 September 2001), para 67 finding that no "state, court, or tribunal’ has 
the right to ‘set aside’ a company’s corporate identity absent party consent or ‘abuse or fraud’ by the 
corporation, and finding that the Claimant had not engaged in any abuse or fraud in the dispute". See also 
Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia (n 173) para 331 assuring that the Tribunal will "bear in mind its 
duty to protect the integrity of ICSID jurisprudence during the merits phase" of the proceedings. 
258 ibid 288.  
259 ibid. 
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breach of good faith. Subsequently, the Mobil tribunal took the analysis a bit further 
distinguishing the jurisdiction ratione temporis260 objection from the abuse of process261 
objection. Temporal scope of jurisdiction is relevant is cases where dispute (or the events 
giving rise to it) already existed at the time of corporate nationality change. If the 
restructuring is done is a timely manner, it is a matter of admissibility of the claim which 
can be deprived on the basis of violation of the good faith principle.262 Finally, in Philip 
Morris, the tribunal specified how to assess the abuse of process in relation to foreseeable 
disputes. 
4.3.1. Good Faith Defence – Phoenix Action  
Phoenix Action Ltd v. The Czech Republic263 is a landmark case reflecting reliance on factors 
beyond the formulation of the IIA. It offers the best starting point to examine prohibitive 
arbitrator attitudes towards treaty shopping via corporate restructuring. The case concerned 
two Czech metal companies (Benet Praha and Benet Group) that were owned and controlled 
by the same individual, a Czech national called Vladimír Beňo. Both companies became 
involved in proceedings before Czech courts: Benet Group in connection with the ownership 
of three other Czech entities (one of which was insolvent) and Benet Praha in a public 
prosecution for alleged tax and custom duty evasions in which the company's assets were 
frozen and seized.264 Subsequently, Mr. Beňo sold the two companies to Phoenix Action 
Ltd, a company constituted under the laws of Israel but ultimately controlled by family 
members of Mr. Beňo. Two months after the acquisition, Phoenix Action Ltd informed the 
Czech Republic of an investment dispute, and later commenced arbitration proceedings 
under the Israel-Czech BIT.265 In its submission, the Claimant alleged that the national courts 
                                                 
260 "By reason of time" Because of the relevant timing or period of time pertaining to the subject under 
consideration. Fellmeth Aaron and Horwitz Maurice, Guide to Latin in International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2011). 
261 For further characterisation see Ribco Borman Yael, 'Treaty Shopping Through Corporate Restructuring of 
Investments: Legitimate Corporate Planning or Abuse of Rights?' in Lavranos Nikolaos, Kok Ruth et 
al. (ed), Hague Yearbook of International Law / Annuaire de La Haye de Droit International, Vol 24 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 368–371. 
262 Jurisdiction refers to the power of a court or tribunal to entertain an action. Conversely, admissibility 
concerns the power of a tribunal to decide a claim at a particular point in time in view of possible temporary 
or permanent defects of the claim. Whereas jurisdiction typically looks at the dispute as a whole, admissibility 
is concerned with particular claims. See Waibel Michael, 'Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility' University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 9/2014. 
263 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic (n 92). 
264 ibid, paras 3–7; Skinner et al. (n 59) 280.  
265 Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the State of Israel for 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (Israel-Czech BIT) 23 September 1997 (entered into 
force 16 March 1999). 
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of the Czech Republic had failed to promptly resolve the actions involving Benet Praha and 
Benet Group, which was equivalent to an expropriation of the Claimant's assets as well as 
violation of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) provision as well as the full protection 
and security (FPS) standards of the BIT.266 
According to the Respondent, Phoenix's allegations fell outside the tribunal's jurisdiction 
both ratione temporis and ratione materiae. Regarding the former the Respondent argued 
that the alleged breaches of the BIT occurred before the Claimant acquired the Czech 
companies, i.e. before the investment was made, so the tribunal had no jurisdiction prior to 
that point of time.267 As to the latter, the Respondent claimed that Phoenix’s alleged purchase 
of the Benet Companies was not an “investment” within the meaning of Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention and Articles 1 and 7 of the BIT.268 Lastly, the Respondent asked the 
tribunal to lift the corporate veil due to abuse of process because “Phoenix [was] nothing 
more than an ex post facto creation of a sham Israeli entity created by a Czech fugitive from 
justice, Vladimír Beňo, to create diversity of nationality.”269 
During deliberations the tribunal engaged in a deep discussion of the applicability and role 
of "good faith" in investment law and, in the end, dismissed the Claimants requests in their 
entirety for the lack of jurisdiction on the basis of Claimant’s abusive treaty shopping, 
thereby accepting the universality of good faith in international investment.270 Even though 
the case involved a round-tripping scenario (the investor company's ultimate owner was of 
the same nationality than the host State) the tribunal's reasoning focused solely on the timing 
and the motives of the nationality change. The tribunal set four criteria to be taken into 
                                                 
266 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic (n 92) paras 44–45. 
267 ibid, para 34. 
268 ibid, paras 35(c) and 38. Respondent argued in its memorial that there was no "allegation or evidence that 
Phoenix has been involved in the business activities relating to its investment. It has been, at most, a passive 
investor in two inactive companies. Surely that cannot suffice to satisfy the definition of “investment” under 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. As Dr Ben Hamida has astutely observed: ICSID jurisprudence is well 
established on the fact that capital or passive money is not enough to be protected". Additionally, with regards 
to the determination of "investment", the Respondent heavily relied on so-called Salini test, which states that 
for an arrangement to qualify as an “investment” it should have, “a certain duration, a regularity of profit and 
return, an element of risk, a substantial commitment and that it should constitute a significant contribution to 
the host State’s development”. See Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade Spa v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (23 July 2001). 
269 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic (n 92) para 34. The Respondent stated that “this case represents 
one of the most egregious cases of ‘treaty-shopping’ that the investment arbitration community has seen in 
recent history." The harsh language used in the State's submission illustrates the strong reactions treaty 
shopping has caused among States. For more discussion about State reactions to treaty shopping see Chapter 5.  
270 De Brabandere Eric, '‘Good Faith’, ‘Abuse of Process’ and the Initiation of Investment Treaty 
Claims' [2012] 3(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 624. 
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consideration in evaluating whether the investor had a bona fide intention to engage in 
economic activities in the host State:271 
I. Timing of the investment: 
Was the investment or other asset already distressed, and was the incoming investor 
aware of these difficulties when it committed to the investment? The Tribunal stated that 
"Phoenix bought an ‘investment’ that was already burdened with the civil litigation as 
well as the problems with the [Czech] tax and customs authorities"272 
II. Timing of the claim 
How long after making the investment did the Claimant bring its ICSID claim? And also, 
is the claim solely based on violations and damages that occurred pre-investment? In this 
case, the tribunal found that Phoenix had notified the Czech Republic of an investment 
dispute even before its ownership of the Benet Companies was registered with local 
authorities. Furthermore, the actions amounting to the alleged violations of the BIT 
provisions occurred prior to the investment.273 
III. Substance of the transaction 
What was the main substance of the transaction, and how was it carried out? The tribunal 
investigated all of the transfers of interest and concluded that the dealings were not made 
on arm's-length basis (which the Claimant admitted). Thus it held the alleged investment 
appeared to be a mere redistribution of assets within the Beňo family.274 
IV. True nature of the operation 
Was any real economic activity performed or even genuinely intended by the investor? 
Here, Phoenix had no business plan, programme of re-financing the Czech entities, or 
economic objectives.275 
Eventually, the Claimant ended up with an order to pay the Respondent's legal fees, as the 
tribunal declined jurisdiction finding that the Claimant's treaty shopping behaviour 
amounted to an "abusive manipulation of the system of international investment protection 
                                                 
271 See Skinner et al. (n 59) 281–282. 
272 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic (n 92) para 136. 
273 ibid, para 138. 
274 ibid, para 139. 
275 ibid, para 140. With this regard it is important to notice the tribunal's concession that "the fact of buying a 
bankrupt or inactive company must not necessarily be disqualified as an investment, as the intent of the investor 
can precisely be to make the company profitable again." 
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under the ICSID Convention and the BITs." In the award, the tribunal emphasised that the 
transaction was not bona fide, but simply the Claimant’s creation of a legal fiction in order 
to gain access to an international arbitration procedure to which it was not entitled.276 The 
combination the timing and the underlying motivations of the restructuring was the crucial 
factor. 
4.3.2.  Ex Ante and Ex Post Nationality Changes – Mobil v. Venezuela 
The subsequent case Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela277 likewise adopted the good faith 
principle as a tool to identify the nationality of the investor. However, the standard of 
evaluation for whether the actions in question were abusive was slightly different. 
In this case, Mobil Corporation and its affiliates were incorporated in the U.S. and in the 
Bahamas, and they entered into series of contracts for the exploitation, production and 
upgrading of heavy crude oil in the Orinoco oil belt with Venezuela's state-owned petroleum 
company. This period represented a time of liberalisation Venezuela's energy market.278 
However, the political climate in the country changed following the millennium (after the 
election of President Hugo Chávez) and a series of measures were taken by the government 
of Venezuela to reform the petroleum industry. In 2001, Venezuela passed a new 
Hydrocarbons Law, and in 2004 it led to an increase in the taxes and royalty rates paid by 
private companies. For Mobil Corporations' agreements this meant a royalty increase from 
1 per cent to 16.67 per cent. In 2006 Venezuela introduced a new extraction tax of 33.33 per 
cent against the foreign operating service agreements while simultaneously increasing the 
associated income tax rate from 34 to 50 per cent .279 Finally, in early 2007, the President 
announced that all the projects that had been operating outside the framework of the 2001 
Hydrocarbons Law, including Mobil projects Cerro Negro and La Ceiba, would be 
nationalised.280 
                                                 
276 ibid, paras 143–144. 
277 Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil Venezolana de 
Petróleos Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd., and Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos, Inc. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (10 June 2010). 
278 In the 1990s Venezuela introduced a new "flexible" oil policy called Apertura Petrolera, which opened its 
upstream oil sector to private investors. This facilitated, for example, the creation of 32 operating service 
agreements with 22 different foreign oil companies – This brought an investment of more than 2 billion dollars. 
See more about the development of Venezuela's energy policies in Mommer Bernard, Changing Venezuelan 
Oil Policy (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 1999). 
279 Blyschak (n 240) 33; Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela (n 277) para 19. 
280 ibid; Jagusch Stephen, Sinclair Anthony, Wickramasooriya Manthi, 'Chapter 13: Restructuring Investments 
to Achieve Investment Treaty Protection' in Kinnear Meg et al. (ed), Building International Investment Law: 
The First 50 Years of ICSID (Kluwer Law International 2015) 181. 
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In 2005, amid these changes in Venezuela's oil industry, the Claimant created a new entity 
(Venezuela Holdings B.V.) under the laws of the Netherlands and inserted it into its 
corporate chain as an indirect owner of the local companies.281 Following the nationalisation 
of the Cerro Negro and La Ceiba projects, the Dutch company initiated ICSID proceedings 
under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT282 seeking compensation for the State's measures. 
Venezuela objected to the tribunal's jurisdiction claiming that Mobil had engaged in 
unlawful treaty shopping by planting a Dutch holding company into an otherwise non-Dutch 
chain of corporate ownership with the sole purpose of accessing more beneficial treaty 
protection. The Claimant, as it was established long after the investment was made, was 
nothing more than a mala fide "corporation of convenience" and its actions were an "abuse 
of the corporate form and blatant treaty-shopping [that] should not be condoned".283 As a 
matter of fact, the Claimant openly confirmed that it made the changes as a precautionary 
measure because the investment climate in Venezuela was deteriorating rapidly, which in 
turn increased the risks of the investment.284 
In light of these statements, the tribunal decided that "the main, if not the sole purpose of the 
restructuring was to protect Mobil investments from adverse Venezuelan measures in getting 
access to ICSID arbitration through the Dutch-Venezuela BIT."285 Nevertheless, the 
arbitrators did not outright condemn this conduct. Instead, they emphasised that the 
distinction between legitimate corporate planning and abuse of rights depended on the 
circumstances in which the restructuring happened.286 
The tribunal recognised the notions of abuse of process and good faith in investment law but 
at the same time held that nationality planning to achieve better protection was a justifiable 
measure – not only in pursuit of substantive advantages but also better dispute settlement 
provisions. With this in mind, the tribunal focused on the timing of the nationality change 
                                                 
281 Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela (n 277) para 20. For further information about the chain structures, see 
paras 21–22. 
282 The Claimant submitted the claims also under national law (the 1999 Venezuelan Law on the promotion 
and protection of interest), but the tribunal found that it has no jurisdiction on those grounds. See Agreement 
on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Venezuela (Netherlands-Venezuela BIT) 22 October 1991 (entered into force 1993).  
283 Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela (n 277) para 27. 
284 ibid, para 189; Jagusch et al. (n 280) 181. The Claimant stated in its counter memorial that after the unilateral 
imposition of a higher royalty rate, Mobil promptly “undertook a review of the extent of the legal protection 
for its investments in Venezuela”. 
285 Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela (n 277) para 190. In addition, the tribunal considered the fact that the 
restructuring was never hidden from the Respondent. In fact, the Claimant had notified the government of the 
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vis-à-vis the timing of the dispute. It concluded that regarding to pre-existing disputes the 
situation is different, and "to restructure investments only in order to gain jurisdiction under 
a BIT for such disputes would constitute abuse of the ICSID Convention and the BITs."287 
Consequently, it accepted jurisdiction over the claims related to the 2007 nationalization of 
Mobil's investments but dismissed jurisdiction over the claims concerning the increased 
royalties and taxes, which occurred before the establishment of the Dutch entity.288 What is 
interesting here is that the Mobil tribunal declined jurisdiction with regards to the pre-
existing disputes on the grounds of abuse of process, when it could have also tackled the 
issue from more a formal point of view – namely by applying the rules of jurisdiction ratione 
temporis.289  
In sum, the Mobil Corporation decision endorses a rather black and white approach to treaty 
shopping. On one hand, it is an acceptable element of strategic corporate planning when used 
to safeguarding overseas investment from disputes that have yet to occur (ex ante). On the 
other hand, such manoeuvres are unacceptable when seeking to compensate for insufficient 
corporate planning earlier in the life of an investment (ex post).290 Such a criterion is easy to 
apply, but it is definitely not immune to question. For instance, how does one determine the 
point of time when the dispute arose? This issue is analysed in greater detail in Section 4.4. 
below. 
4.3.3. Abuse of Rights – Philip Morris 
A more recent, and much debated, case declining jurisdiction for abuse of process is Philip 
Morris v. Australia.291 Unlike the Mobil tribunal, the arbitrators in this case made a clear 
distinction between ratione temporis objections and abuse of process objections, 
consequently digging deeper into the application of the latter. Here, the dispute arose from 
                                                 
287 ibid, para 205 (emphasis added). 
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(so before the reorganization) of the existence of a dispute resulting from the adverse royalty and tax increases.  
289 On the contrary, the tribunal is Levy and Gremcitel v. Peru considered that an abuse of process objection 
must be distinguished from a ratione temporis objection: "If a claimant acquires an investment after the date 
on which the challenged act occurred, the tribunal will normally lack jurisdiction ratione temporis and there 
will be no room for an abuse of process." See Renée Rose Levy and Gremcitel S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/11/17, Award (9 January 2015), para 182. 
290 Blyschak (n 240) 35. 
291 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (17 December 2015). This case is significant in the context of broader 
policy and political perspectives as well – namely regarding State's sovereign right to decide on their laws and 
regulations to protect the health of their population and the danger of chilling effect. See more in a similar case 
that proceeded to the merits phase:  Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos 
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (8 July 2016). 
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the enactment and enforcement of the Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Act of 21 
November 2011 and its implementing regulations, which imposed strict restrictions on the 
appearance of retail tobacco products.292 The regulatory and related measures were part of 
the Australian government's comprehensive efforts to reduce smoking in the country.  
The Claimant, Philip Morris Asia (PM Asia), was a Hong-Kong incorporated company that 
served as the regional headquarters for the tobacco giant Philip Morris International (PMI). 
On 23 February 2011, PMI transferred its two Australian subsidiaries (Philip Morris 
Australia and Philip Morris Limited) to PM Asia, thus putting the company into the chain of 
ownership and control of the Australian investments.293 This reorganisation enabled the 
Claimant to initiate arbitration under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT. It claimed damages for 
indirect expropriation and unfair treatment, alleging that Australia's plain packaging 
measures infringed the intellectual property rights of its new subsidiaries.294 The Respondent 
contested all claims on the merits and raised jurisdictional objections. The Respondent 
argued that the claim was not in the scope of the BIT because it related to a dispute that pre-
dated the restructuring by which the Claimant acquired ownership of the Australian 
companies (the ratione temporis objection), or, failing that, because the Claimant's actions 
amounted to abuse of process. 
Besides the important public health considerations, this case was characterised by the timing 
factor, namely the foreseeability of the dispute. First, the arbitral tribunal confirmed that the 
distinction between the ratione temporis objection and abuse of rights objection was now 
clear from the jurisprudence.295 Concerning the former, the tribunal held that the critical date 
is when the State adopted the disputed measure, which in this case was the date of enacting 
the plain packaging legislation, because before that moment the investor's right could not be 
affected.296 Since the restructuring was both decided (3 September 2010) and completed (23 
                                                 
292 The regulation basically prevents any use of colours, logos, other embellishments and trademarks. Tobacco 
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294 ibid, paras 7–8; Baumgartner Jorun, 'The Significance of the Notion of Dispute and Its Foreseeability in an 
Investment Claim Involving a Corporate Restructuring' [2017] 18(2) Journal of World Investment and 
Trade 206–207. 
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296 ibid, para 533. 
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February 2011) before the date of enactment (21 November 2011), the tribunal concluded 
that the requirements for jurisdiction ratione temporis were met.297 
The tribunal then turned to the question of abuse of rights and reviewed the relevant case 
law on this point. As a preliminary observation the tribunal clarified that "[I]t is clear, and 
recognised by all earlier decisions that the threshold for finding an abusive initiation of an 
investment claim is high.298 Further, referring to several prior arbitral awards, the tribunal 
concluded that the "mere fact of restructuring an investment to obtain BIT benefits is not per 
se illegitimate."299 On the other hand, if restructuring is made to obtain BIT benefits for a 
foreseeable dispute, it may amount to abuse of process, depending on the circumstances of 
the particular case.300 
In this case, the tribunal examined the restructuring in the context of political developments 
in Australia. Several facts implicated that the risk of a specific dispute was foreseeable to 
the Claimant. The Claimant had notified the Australian Minister for Health already in 2009 
that the plain packaging would interfere with its property rights. On 29 April 2010, the then-
Australian government unequivocally announced its intentions to introduce major tobacco 
control measures. A few months later the government published a timetable that displayed 
the implementation schedule of the tobacco legislation. In the tribunal’s view, there was no 
uncertainty about the Respondent's intention to introduce plain packaging regulation as of 
April 2010. Accordingly, there was at least a reasonable probability that such measures 
would eventually be adopted, which would trigger a dispute.301 
Interestingly, the tribunal did not stop there, but went on to investigate the Claimant's alleged 
commercial reasons for the restructuring. By this, it acknowledged that, in principle, a 
legitimate and credible motive for the restructuring might invalidate an otherwise abuse of 
process finding.302 The reality is that corporate groups, particularly multinational ones, are 
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routinely restructured for many reasons. However, the Claimant was not able to prove that 
tax or other business reasons were determinative for the reorganisation. Instead, all of the 
evidence pointed to the conclusion that "the main and determinative, if not sole, reason for 
the restructuring was the intention to bring a claim under the Treaty, using an entity from 
Hong Kong."303 Consequently, the tribunal found the Claimant's claims inadmissible and, 
thereby, it declined to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.304 
To conclude the discussion on the Philip Morris case, the determination of jurisdiction in 
treaty shopping cases is a two-tier-test. In the first stage one must identify the point in time 
when the dispute materialised and compare it to the date of the change of nationality. If the 
restructuring was made before the State measure (i.e. when the adverse effect on the 
investment came true), jurisdiction exists. When this test is passed, the tribunal can evaluate 
the admissibility of the claim using abuse of process principle. In this phase the foreseeability 
of a future dispute becomes crucial. The decision, albeit clarifying in many respects, raises 
further issues – namely, when does a dispute arise and when is it foreseeable to the investor.   
4.3.4. Preliminary Conclusions 
Case law prohibiting treaty shopping is diverse and rather inconsistent. In addition to the 
most ground-breaking decisions analysed above, the jurisdiction was also denied in cases 
like Banro American Resources v. Congo305, Société Générale v. The Dominican Republic306 
and Cementownia v. Turkey307. Although reaching similar conclusions, the tribunals' 
justifications appear inconsistent. For example, in Banro a Canadian entity transferred its 
investment to an U.S. subsidiary to gain access to ICSID arbitration.308 The U.S. investor 
commenced arbitration proceedings merely two days after the transfer, which raised the 
suspicions. Here, the tribunal relied on the nemo plus iuris transfere potest quam ipse habet 
principle (no one can transfer more rights than he himself has) and concluded that a non-
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305 Banro American Resources, Inc. and Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema S.A.R.L. v. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/7, Award (1 September 2000). 
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ICSID State cannot transfer any valid consent to ICSID arbitration to its subsidiary located 
in a ICSID Member State since such right never existed in the first place.309 Then again, in 
Cementownia the tribunal found the Claimant's conduct downright illegal, a prime example 
of a fraudulent mala fide claim. The crucial issue was whether Cementownia had acquired 
the investment prior to the dispute. Surprisingly, the Claimant in this case was unable to 
prove the timing of the acquisition, but the tribunal assessed the issue of abuse of rights 
nevertheless. It found the Claimant "guilty of procedural misconduct" and declared that "the 
Claimant has intentionally and in bad faith abused the arbitration; it purported to be an 
investor when it knew that this was not the case."310 This is a rather strong attitude compared 
to other similar cases, although the circumstances were distinctive as well. Despite their 
unique characteristics, these decisions also stressed the timing factor as a conclusive factor 
in determining the permissibility of treaty shopping. 
The overview of jurisprudence discussed in previous Subsections allows for some 
preliminary conclusions. First, even when the tribunals have adopted a prohibitive attitude 
towards treaty shopping, no universal rule against the lawfulness of treaty shopping in 
general has emerged. Second, it appears that the abuse of process doctrine has a growing 
significance in future cases. Tribunals acknowledge that investors are free to arrange their 
affairs so as to gain the most favourable IIA protection, but simultaneously require some 
level of good faith. However, what level can still be regarded as appropriate remains 
ambiguous. The assessment is not only based on timing but also the underlying 
circumstances and intentions, which makes the line between legitimate nationality changes 
and abusive behaviour very fine. The bottom line is that the foresighted investors are 
rewarded, while those who fail to act well in advance are excluded from the protection of 
the IIA.   
Moving on from the battle between treaty-based and external standard approaches and to 
further clarify the crucial distinction between foreseeable and unexpected disputes, I will 
next advance to the question of timing. Above all, I will analyse the different "foreseeability 
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tests" used by investment tribunals and attempt to find a common rule as to when an investor 
can be expected to predict a future dispute. 
4.4. Tipping the Scales: The Question of Timing 
It seems that, at least for the time being, foreign investors may enjoy the advantages of treaty 
shopping as long as they abide by the principle of good faith. The investor's good faith has 
been assessed heavily based on the timing of the actions that led to the nationality change in 
relation to the dispute. In this regard, we can distinguish disputes that have already risen 
before the corporate restructuring from the disputes that have yet to materialise. Both 
categories are troubled by uncertainty and are, to a certain extent, intertwined. For the sake 
of clarity, I will analyse pre-existing disputes and foreseeability separately. After all, their 
difference is fundamental; the former effects jurisdiction ratione temporis,311 while the latter 
is a tool to evaluate whether the reorganization or acquisition of an investment constitutes 
an abuse of rights. 
4.4.1. Pre-Existing Disputes 
The discussion of pre-existing disputes boils down to one question: when does a dispute 
arise? Although this may appear clear-cut at first sight, discovering the precise starting point 
of a dispute is another story. Furthermore, arbitral tribunals have produced rather 
inconsistent conclusions in this respect.312  
In some cases, the tribunals have found the date of the notification of the claim or the request 
for arbitration to be decisive for the commencement of a dispute.313 This method has the 
advantage of providing a high degree of certainty, as the commencement of the dispute 
requires the satisfaction of certain formalities.314 However, the act or omission causing the 
actual harm to the investment frequently pre-dates the legal initiation of the claim or arbitral 
proceedings. The inevitable time-lag between the event and the formal commencement of 
the dispute leaves arbitrators practically blind to any changes in the investor's nationality or 
                                                 
311 For discussion on the question why pre-existing disputes should be excluded in the first place see 
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312 ibid 219. 
313 See e.g. Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on Jurisdiction (8 
December 2003) para 55; Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Ad Hoc Tribunal, Final 
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ownership structure of the investment between the date when the claim could have been 
initiated and the date when it was actually initiated.315 
On the other hand, some tribunals have focused on the date of the (alleged) breach of the 
treaty obligations or on the date of the harm or injury, such as taking of an asset or revocation 
of a permit.316 Under normal circumstances the exact starting time of the dispute has very 
little significance, given that once the Claimant has sent the request for arbitration, it is clear 
for everyone involved that a dispute exists between the parties. However, it matters greatly 
in cases of treaty shopping, considering that the case may be dismissed entirely if the 
investor's restructuring is ill-timed in relation to the date of breach or harm.317  
Identifying a specific date of breach or harm/injury is often problematic. Several points in 
time may be relevant in this context. Indeed, a breach or the harm resulting from it can be a 
one-time act, a continuing act or a composite series of acts,318 which distinction is also 
reflected in International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.319 In a typical one-time act, for example, enactment of an 
expropriation decree or a law that interferes with the investment, the dispute commences at 
the precise moment when the act is performed, even if its consequences extend in time.320 A 
continuing act extends over the period during which the act is not in conformity with the 
treaty obligation, e.g. refusing to issue a license or a permit over a certain period of time.321 
Conversely, a composite act includes a series of different actions or omissions making up 
the wrongful act and takes place at the time when the last relevant event occurs.322 The 
                                                 
315 ibid. For example, in Phoenix Action and Cementownia and Europe Cement cases the dispute commenced 
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classification may sometimes come close to arbitrary as the facts and events surrounding 
investment disputes are often complex and entangled. 
Moreover, tribunals have taken both broad and narrow views on the boundaries of a dispute. 
The previously examined Mobil v. Venezuela case is an example of a narrow framing of a 
dispute; the tribunal regarded the dispute over royalties and income tax to be separate from 
the dispute over nationalization.323 Then again, the tribunal in AMTO v. Ukraine decided that 
the dispute had already started at the time of filing the claim letters relating to a commercial 
dispute because the subsequent treaty claims stemmed from the same factual background.324 
The preference of narrow or broad understanding of the dispute depends largely on whether 
the arbitrators focus on the underlying facts or the nature of the disagreement itself.325 
In conclusion, the various approaches to determine the starting point and the scope of a 
dispute leave wide discretion to the arbitrators and thus generate considerable confusion and 
unpredictability regarding the timing issue in treaty shopping cases.  
4.4.2. Foreseeable Disputes 
In the previously analysed Philip Morris v. Australia case the Claimant had undisputedly 
completed its restructuring and acquired an interest in the Australian investments before the 
dispute had arisen. Yet, the Claimant's behaviour was not perceived as legitimate nationality 
planning and the claims were dismissed. The tribunal held that under the specific 
circumstances of the case, the Claimant could certainly foresee the impending disagreement 
with the Australian government, and thus its actions amounted to abuse of process. From the 
investor's (who technically carried out the nationality change in a timely manner) point of 
view, the outcome is alarming. When is the anticipation of a dispute so detectable that the 
investor is expected to see it coming? 
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To answer this question, several investment tribunals have developed foreseeability tests that 
are broadly similar, yet in detail slightly diverging.326 The most prevalent test was created 
by the tribunal in Pac Rim v. El Salvador: "[T]he dividing-line occurs when the relevant 
party can see an actual dispute or can foresee a specific future dispute as a very high 
probability and not merely as a possible controversy".327 If the line is crossed, abuse of 
process will ordinarily be found. However, the tribunal emphasised that the outcome is 
dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case.  
The tribunal in Tidewater v. Venezuela endorsed this test, but added that a nationality change 
in order to facilitate access to treaty coverage is generally abusive if the subsequently 
commenced dispute was within the "reasonable contemplation" of the investor or 
"reasonably foreseeable" at the time of the reorganization.328 Further, in the case of Lao 
Holdings v. Laos, the arbitrators asked whether the dispute was "highly probable".329  
All these tests set a rather high threshold for the foreseeability of a dispute, which implies 
that an abuse of process should not be easily found either. This was also confirmed in 
Levy v. Venezuela, where the tribunal stated that "[it] will obviously not presume an abuse, 
and will affirm the evidence of an abuse only in very exceptional circumstances."330 Further, 
it clarified that "the closer the acquisition of the investment is to the act giving rise to the 
dispute, the higher the degree of foreseeability will normally be."331 
Foreseeability is a profoundly fact-specific notion. All relevant facts and circumstances must 
be evaluated, and still an element of juridical discretion remains.332 Dr Jorun Baumgartner 
notes that requiring only that the investor could foresee an upcoming dispute with a high 
probability arguably emphasises the investor's horizon too much, and correspondingly lacks 
a vital objective element that would prevent strategic allegations.333 Adding the requirement 
of reasonableness introduces the assessment of whether a reasonable investor would have 
been able to anticipate the future dispute.334 Even with this corrective, a tribunal always 
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evaluates foreseeability of a certain dispute with the benefit of hindsight, and thus it may be 
impossible for the investor to know if the dividing-line has been passed at time of 
reorganising its corporate structure. The problem is particularly acute in cases of continuous 
and composite acts when the entire course of State's conduct has significant commonalities. 
However, it seems clear that the foreseeability requirement refers to a specific future dispute 
and, consequently, a generally deteriorating investment climate would not suffice.335 The 
opposite conclusion would be rather unreasonable for foreign investors.  
As a final remark on this matter, it is worth noticing that the above-mentioned tests may 
unintentionally encourage calculated sovereign measures or the threat of such. 
A strategically prudent State, trying to anticipate and avoid future investment claims, may 
deliberately escalate potential controversies with a foreign investor. Alternatively, a State 
could "flag" in advance all the potential sovereign measures it might take, in order to 
prematurely tackle any doubts regarding foreseeability of a dispute.336 Therefore, foreign 
investors would be well-advised to execute any corporate structure changes before any 
deterioration of relations with the host State occurs. In situations where the atmosphere is 
already tense, it would be wise to notify the host State of the acquisition or transfer, and to 
ensure a track of record concerning the post-restructuring investment activities.337 
In conclusion, the timing of a corporate restructure or transfer is of utmost importance in 
both determining arbitral jurisdiction and identifying an abuse of process. There are, 
however, multiple ways to pinpoint the outset or probability of a specific dispute. Whichever 
approach introduced above prevails in the future case law, arbitrators should make their 
decisions with a view to legal certainty. What is more, defining the boundaries of abusive 
claims will promote a climate of mutual trust between investors and host States which is 
vital for the investment flows.  
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5. RESPONSES AND SOLUTIONS 
Having clarified the line between acceptable and unacceptable treaty shopping, it is time to 
move on to practical implications of the practice. In this Chapter, I will elaborate on some 
State reactions to the treaty shopping phenomenon. This is done through two examples, after 
which I will assess the possible means to curb treaty shopping – if States wish to do so. 
Finally, I will discuss the most relevant aspects that an investor should consider before 
making the decision to engage in treaty shopping.  
5.1. How Have States Reacted? 
As discussed above in Chapter 3, it is, in principle, neither illegal nor inappropriate for a 
foreign investor to organise its investment to avail itself of maximum protection under 
existing IIAs. Rather, changing nationality via changing corporate structure to gain a 
beneficial regulatory and legal environment is a standard feature of diligent management in 
international economic relations.338 However, such conduct has frequently been frowned 
upon by the community of States. This negative reaction is understandable considering that 
host States are at the receiving end of treaty shopping, particularly vulnerable to additional 
investment claims brought by investors who were not initially intended to be covered by the 
treaty in question.  
Below I provide two real life examples of how States have responded to treaty shopping. 
First, in Subsection 5.1.1, I will examine the Netherlands' pro-business approach to drafting 
investment treaties and how this has aroused opposition among contracting parties who have 
been exposed to arbitration proceedings brought under Dutch BITs. Then in Subsection 
5.1.2, I will canvass States' resistance to ISDS mechanisms with a special emphasis on Latin 
American States' growing interest in withdrawing from the ICSID Convention. It should be 
noted that treaty shopping has not per se been the core issue in these examples. Rather, it is 
part of the problem emphasising the concerns about the entire investment system. In this 
regard, treaty shopping can be characterised as a triggering factor. 
5.1.1. Just pretend to be Dutch – Case of the Netherlands 
The letter combination B.V. comes up frequently in arbitration cases concerning treaty 
shopping. The acronym stands for Dutch limited liability company (besloten venootschap) 
which is an often used vehicle to shop into Dutch BITs. Indeed, Dutch companies are widely 
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used in international trade and dispute resolution, which for one part stems from Dutch 
foreign trade policy.339 The government of the Netherlands pursues one of the most liberal 
foreign investment policies in the developed world. With some 160 IIAs in force, the country 
maintains one of the largest BIT networks and is therefore an attractive target State for 
nationality planning.340 Duly, the Netherlands has taken a central position in the ongoing 
debate around IIAs.341 More than 12 per cent of all known investment treaty claims exploit 
Dutch BITs, which makes the Netherlands the most frequent home State for investment 
arbitration cases after the United States.342 According to an analysis by the Centre for 
Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) a remarkable majority (over 75%) of 
investment cases involving a Dutch IIA are brought by mailbox companies with no real 
economic ties to the Netherlands and their ultimate or controlling parent company based 
somewhere else than the Netherlands.343 Overall, it is estimated that foreign investors have 
used Dutch BITs to claim more than USD 100 billion from host States.344  
Foreign investors are tempted to set up corporate structures that route investments though 
the Netherlands precisely because of the broadly phrased and open-ended protections 
included in its BITs (named as the "gold standard" of investment protection). Firstly, Dutch 
BITs generally qualify indirectly controlled foreign investors as nationals, entitled to full 
protection.345 Therefore, they facilitate the easy establishment of shell companies, which 
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enables legal entities with no substantial link to the Netherlands to gain treaty protections 
that their own State of origin may not be willing to extend to investors from the State actually 
hosting their investments, including the host State's own nationals.346 Secondly, Dutch BITs 
mostly include the widest possible definition of investment, which covers "every kind of 
asset" and does not require any actual contribution to the country's economic 
development.347 Thirdly, these treaties include expansive ISDS clauses, which guarantee 
more comprehensive private property rights to foreign investors than what is usually granted 
in national constitutions or EU law.348 
These characteristics have rendered the Netherlands a popular "base camp", particularly for 
investment in the developing world, consequently leaving some investment-importing States 
dissatisfied. In 2008, the Venezuelan government unilaterally denounced its BIT with the 
Netherlands.349 Thereafter four more States have followed suit: Bolivia terminated its BIT 
in 2009, South Africa in 2014, Indonesia in 2015, and most recently India in 2016.350  
Terminating an entire IIA is a radical response to the threat of investment arbitration, that 
treaty shopping increases, and profoundly effects the whole investment framework of that 
country.351 Therefore, the States feeling the pressure to change the course of things should 
rather endeavour to renegotiate more suitable wording for treaty provisions which they deem 
the most critical.352 As for the Netherlands, there is currently an active discussion with 
regards to revising Dutch investment policy.353 While eager to preserve their investor-
friendly approach as a trump card to attract entities to incorporate within Dutch borders, it 
may endanger diplomatic relations with host States that are being sued under Dutch BITs.354 
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A State is not an attractive destination in the first place if it does not have IIAs with States 
that attract investment. 
5.1.2. The Backlash against Investment Arbitration – Withdrawal from the 
ICSID Convention   
Another noteworthy example of State reactions to treaty shopping is the trend to remove 
ISDS clauses from IIAs. This is particularly evidenced by some Latin American countries' 
withdrawal from the ICSID Convention.  As indicated in Section 2.1, one of the main 
characteristics of the BIT proliferation was the introduction of ISDS mechanisms, namely 
giving foreign investors a direct right to sue the host State. While the ISDS regime has 
arguably made a significant contribution to the fluent settlement of investment disputes,355 
the dramatic increase in the number of investment arbitration has generated increasing signs 
of backlash against ISDS and pressure to reform the current system.356 Such a backlash from 
States is not solely a symptom of treaty shopping, but is indisputably aggravated by it as host 
States become more exposed to a growing number of investment claims by nationals of a 
third State, or even their own nationals. In any event, granting foreign investors direct 
remedies against host governments has surely encouraged foreign investors to shop for IIAs 
that provide them the best possible dispute resolution clauses.357 
As discussed in Section 3.2, ISDS mechanisms are an important incentive to treaty shop. 
Hence, omitting ISDS clauses from the IIAs has the potential to greatly reduce the practice 
of treaty shopping and exposure to additional investment claims, albeit only under the 
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condition that the great majority of States would adopt this approach.358 However, for the 
time being, few States have deliberately decided to opt out of ISDS. For example, the 
Australian government announced in its 2011 Trade Policy Statement359 that it would no 
longer agree to investor-State arbitration provisions in its future investment treaties or FTA 
chapters.360 Australia's stricter policy was, at least in part, motivated by the Philip Morris 
case that threatened to limit its legislative powers with regard to public health issues. Indeed, 
the country concluded the 2012 Australia-Malaysia FTA361 and the 2014 Australia-Japan 
EPA362 without ISDS clause.363 
Perhaps the most drastic and visible manifestation of the backlash against ISDS is the 
denunciation of the ICSID Convention by some Latin American States.364 Similar to any 
other international treaty, the ICSID Convention is subject to denouncement by a 
Contracting Party if it considers that the treaty no longer corresponds to its interests. Bolivia 
was the first country to withdraw the Convention in 2007,365 followed by Ecuador in 2009,366 
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and Venezuela in 2012.367 The trend is not surprising considering the relevant role Latin 
American countries have played in ICSID arbitration (and the unfavourable decisions 
obtained) over the years. Approximately 30 per cent 368 of all known ICSID cases are brought 
against Latin American States. Consequently, as frequent respondents, they are also most 
influenced by treaty shopping. Therefore, these three States have determined that investment 
protection backed by ICSID arbitration – and intensified by treaty shopping – poses an 
unacceptable risk to their policy space and public budgets.369 Whether this reaction results 
in the desired effect as a protective shield against treaty shopping is still debatable. The 
current system undeniably has its weaknesses and abuses do exist. However, it was created 
for good reason and thus far the great majority of States do not seem to fundamentally call 
it into question. There are also far less radical options for States that wish to protect 
themselves from Treaty Shoppers. 
5.2. Ways to Curb Treaty Shopping 
Having demonstrated that States have maintained rather negative perceptions towards treaty 
shopping, I will next discuss and assess three possible lines of strategy that are available to 
States in decreasing their exposure to treaty shopping practices. However, listing these 
means does not imply that treaty shopping ought to be forbidden. On the contrary, in this 
Study, I argue that it is an inevitable part of global business activity, and despite some of the 
downsides, treaty shopping as a whole does not endanger the investment regime.370 
Nevertheless, when done solely for the purpose of commencing arbitration against the host 
State, it might amount to abuse of the system and that type of treaty shopping ought to be 
prevented.  States are, figuratively speaking, the "Masters" of the investment treaties and 
therefore any solution to the unwanted consequences created by treaty shopping lies, to a 
great extent, in their own hands.371 These solutions can be political by nature, such as 
multilateral/global initiatives, termination of risky IIAs or a State's decision to leave out 
ISDS provisions. States can also act through treaty drafting methods like adopting more 
restrictive definitions of investor or using of denial of benefits clauses. In this Chapter, I will 
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Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention' 26 January 2012.  
368 By March 2018 there are a total of 668 cases. In 199 of them a Latin American State was the Respondent. 
See ICSID Database https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx. 
369 Giraud Martinelli Vanessa, 'Modern Authoritarian Regimes and the Denunciation of the ICSID 
Convention' in Baltag Crina (ed), ICSID Convention after 50 Years: Unsettled Issues (Kluwer Law 
International 2016) 504–507. 
370 See the possible benefits of treaty shopping in Section 3.4. 
371 Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 239. 
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introduce some of these means, and assess their feasibility for curbing treaty shopping in 
international arbitration. 
5.2.1. Denial of Benefits Clause  
An often favoured method to limit treaty shopping by corporate nationality planning is 
the so-called "denial of benefits clause" (hereafter DOB). With such provisions the host State 
reserves the right, in certain circumstances, to deny the benefits of the applicable IIA to a 
claimant that in theory meets the definition of "investor" but in reality lacks a relevant 
connection to its purported home State.372 DOB clauses are grounded in treaty text, and 
therefore by including such a provision in the IIA, contracting States are able to articulate in 
precise terms the kind of closeness is required to receive treaty protection.373 The 
preconditions of invoking such a clause are stated in the wording of the provision, for 
example, the claimant company is owned or controlled by non-protected investors, or has no 
substantial business activities in the country of incorporation.374 Nonetheless, tribunals have 
reached remarkably inconsistent decisions as to when, how and with what effect DOB 
clauses can and should be invoked.375 
Professor Mark Feldman particularly advocates using DOB provisions as the main method 
to curb treaty shopping. According to him, they provide greater stability and predictability 
in investor-State arbitration (in comparison to solving the issue with the abuse of rights 
doctrine, which has been applied inconsistently by different tribunals). DOB clauses are 
treaty-based and therefore they reflect the express and shared views of the parties to the 
treaty instead of ambiguous principles.376 However, the formulation of DOB clauses is often 
                                                 
372 Ziadé Roland and Melchionda Lorenzo, 'Structuring and Restructuring of Investment in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration' in Rovine Arthur W. (ed), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The 
Fordham Papers (Brill – Nijhoff 2015) 395; Douglas Zachary, The International Law of Investment 
Claims (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) 468–472 and Collins (n 8) 87–88.  
373 For example Article 17 of the ECT provides that: "Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the 
advantages of this Part to…a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own or control such entity and 
if that entity has no substantial business activities in the Area of the Contracting Party in which it is 
organized…" See Energy Charter Treaty (n 170). 
374 Early versions of DOB clauses can be traced back to the time after World War II as they appeared in FCN 
treaties signed by the United States in 1950s. From then on such clauses have been increasingly incorporated 
in both multilateral and bilateral investment treaties. Especially the United States continues to include DOB 
provisions in BITs and investment chapters of FTAs. In addition, frequent users of such clauses are Canada, 
Mexico, Japan, Korea, China, Australia, New Zealand, Peru, Lebanon and Austria. Most significant 
multilateral treaties including DOB provision are ECT, ASEAN Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and 
CAFTA-DR. Zhang (n 171) 57; Feldman (n 166) 293–294. 
375 Gastrell Lindsay and Le Cannu Paul-Jean, 'Procedural Requirements of ‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clauses in 
Investment Treaties: A Review of Arbitral Decisions' [2015] 30(1) ICSID Review 78–97. 
376 Feldman (n 166) 283, 301, 302. 
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vague, and thus their interpretation has raised various issues. DOB clauses usually provide 
that each contracting party "reserves the right"377 to deny or "may"378 deny benefits to an 
investor whenever certain substantive conditions are met. On that account, tribunals have 
often held that the right to deny benefits does not operate ipso jure. Instead the State must 
positively exercise it.  
DOB clauses have also raised certain practical questions. In response to States' attempts to 
deny treaty benefits, several investment tribunals have imposed an evidentiary burden on the 
respondent State to demonstrate that the factual prerequisites in the applicable DOB 
provision have been fulfilled.379 However, given that the Claimant, in most cases, will have 
better access to the evidence connected with its own business activities and ownership 
structure, a rigid application of the burden of proof could undermine the utility of DOB 
provisions in the future. Instead, if the tribunals adopted a more flexible approach,380 DOB 
clauses would function more effectively in discouraging foreign investors from treaty 
shopping through corporate restructuring. 
Another issue regarding DOB clauses is whether the host State is required to make a formal 
declaration of its intent to avail itself of the right to deny benefits to investors. Further, if 
such a requirement to notify exists, will it be considered as having prospective effect, bearing 
only on future investors, or retroactive effect, covering investments already made?381 The 
distinction is crucial as accepting retroactive invocation remarkably limits the possibility of 
treaty shopping.  
                                                 
377 See e.g. Art 17 ECT (n 170). 
378 See e.g. Art. 10.12.2 CAFTA-DR and Art. 1113(2) NAFTA (n 169) 
379 Feldman (n 166) 296. For example, in the case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic the tribunal ruled that the 
Respondent had the burden to establish relevant facts regarding the Claimant Company's ownership structure 
and nature of its business activities. Similarly, the tribunal in AMTO v. Ukraine (n 324) placed the burden of 
proof to the State. However, the tribunal expressly acknowledged that it might be difficult for the Respondent 
to "determine who owns or controls an Investor when ownership or control might involve a number of entities 
in different jurisdictions." Then again, the tribunal in Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine was not so 
understanding. It refused to make any accommodation in light of the Claimant's superior access to the relevant 
proof concerning denial of benefits issue. See Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 
126/2003, Award (29 March 2005); Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award 
(16 September 2003) and AMTO v. Ukraine (n 324) para 65. 
380 Similar to AMTO v. Ukraine (n 324). 
381 Thorn and Doucleff (n 168) 24–25; Ziade and Melchionda (n 372) 395. For more discussion see Pinto 
Débora, Is the retrospective exercise of the ‘denial of benefits’ clause contrary to the investor’s legitimate 
expectations under the Energy Charter Treaty? (Working Paper, Maastricht University 2016). 
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One of the first cases in which this question was profoundly analysed was Plama Consortium 
Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria.382 Here, the Respondent sought to deny benefits to the 
Claimant after the arbitration had already commenced. The tribunal took an investor-friendly 
approach and ruled that a presumed investor has the right to "reasonable notice" as to 
whether the host State will exercise its right under the DOB clause. The tribunal emphasised 
that the right to deny benefits should not be retroactive but only prospective from the date 
of exercising that right.383 
To impose such a proactive notification duty on States is not without problems. Some 
scholars have criticised the Plama line of reasoning as potentially rendering DOB provisions 
de facto meaningless.384 Namely, "[t]he host State may not even be aware at the time of the 
existence of a new investment made in its territory, let alone the nationality of that investor, 
the extent of its business activities in its home State, and the nationality of its underlying 
owners or controllers."385 This difficulty was also noted in the Pac Rim case, and hence the 
tribunal reached the opposite conclusion. According to this tribunal there was no express 
time limit in the applicable treaty (here CAFTA-DR) for the host State to exercise its right 
to deny benefits as imposing such a limitation "would create considerable practical 
difficulties" for parties of the treaty.386 A State cannot be expected to keep track of the day-
                                                 
382 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(8 February 2005). For discussion on balancing between the investor's interests and conflicting concerns of 
state sovereignty in this case see Essig Holger, 'Balancing Investors' Interests and State Sovereignty: The 
ICSID-Decision on Jurisdiction Plama Consortium Ltd v Republic of Bulgaria' [2007] 4(5) Transnational 
Dispute Management. 
383 Similarly the tribunals in Yukos, Pan America and Liman Caspian Oil imposed a notice requirement on 
States, reaffirming that the exercise of DOB right only has retrospective effect. See Yukos Universal Limited 
(Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility (30 November 2009); Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company 
v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Preliminary Objections (27 July 2006); 
Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 
Award (22 June 2010). 
384 See Thorn and Doucleff (n 168) 25. Similarly in Feldman (n 166) 300; Voon, Mitchell and Munro 
(n 196) 55. 
385 Sinclair Anthony, 'Investment Protection for “Mailbox Companies” under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty: 
A note on one aspect of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Plama Consortium Ltd v Republic of Bulgaria' [2005] 
2(5) Transnational Dispute Management 5. 
386 Pac Rim v. Republic of El Salvador (n 319) para 4.85. Costa Rica and the United States submitted non-
disputing party submission regarding this issue. Costa Rica argued that "[a] State Party to DR-CAFTA is not 
necessarily informed at all times of the share make-up and corporate structure of all investors from other 
Parties to the Treaty in its territory. What is more likely is that the State only becomes aware of who owns or 
controls a company at the time when there is a dispute, which escalates into an investment arbitration." The 
U.S. further observed that requiring a respondent to provide notice before a claim is submitted to arbitration 
would, in effect, require the respondent "to monitor the ever-changing business activities of all enterprises in 
the territories of each of the other six CAFTA-DR Parties that attempt to make, are making, or have made 
investments in the territory of the respondent." See paras 4.53 and 4.56 (quoting the respective submissions). 
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to-day business activities and ownership structure of all legal entities investing in its 
territory.387 It remains to be seen which approach will prevail. 
To conclude, DOB clauses offer one of the most effective tools for States to set boundaries 
to treaty shopping by corporate investors. In addition, such provisions can also provide 
clearer guidance to investors with regard to the level of connection they must have to their 
respective home State in order to be assured of IIA protections.388 The efficiency of DOB 
clauses, however, requires that they are phrased explicitly enough and that the tribunals 
interpret them in a flexible manner, refraining from imposing unrealistic requirements on 
States invoking DOB provisions.  
5.2.2. Renegotiating the Substantive Provisions of IIAs  
Another possible way to deal with treaty shopping is through renegotiating substantive 
provisions of IIAs. As previously discussed in this Study, arbitral tribunals have over the 
past years adopted inconsistent attitudes towards the treaty shopping practice, leaving some 
essential questions open or raising more questions than they actually answer.389 By 
reformulating some of the key provisions,390 States can adapt their treaty framework to 
counter the possibility of treaty shopping, and at the same time increase overall certainty in 
their investment regimes. In fact, rapid developments in investment practice and 
jurisprudence have already led some States to renegotiate old IIAs and to develop new model 
                                                 
387 The tribunals in EMELEC and Ulysseas were thinking along the same lines and explicitly accepted 
invocation of DOB clause simultaneously with the statement of defence. See Empresa Eléctrica del Ecuador, 
Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9, Award (2 June 2009) para 71 and Ulysseas, Inc. v. 
The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-19, Interim Award (28 September 2010) para 173. 
However, allowing the retrospective effect may indeed put foreign investors in a somewhat fragile position, 
since the investor will never know if there might be a denial of benefits exactly when the investor needs to rely 
on them. However, one cannot say that such a denial would come as a total surprise for the investor as the 
existence of DOB provision is known to the investor who has opted to invest into the contracting State though 
a corporate vehicle controlled by a national of a third State and which had no substantial business activities in 
its incorporation State. Same observations were made by the tribunal in Guaracachi America v. Bolivia. See 
Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2011-17, Award (31 January 2014) para 383. 
388 Feldman (n 166) 302. 
389 See Chapter 4; Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 242. 
390 In addition to the substantive parts of a treaty, States should further clarify the respective preambles. Though 
preamble has no binding force in international law, its interpretative value should not be overlooked. Preamble 
generally contains the policy rationale for the conclusion of the treaty, and therefore including explicit referral 
to the reciprocal nature of the treaty can, at least to some extent, contribute to prevent treaty shopping attempts 
by putative investor-claimants. While it is not the sharpest-cutting knife for States wishing to curb treaty 
shopping, the preamble communicates the underlying intents of the parties to the tribunal when it is engaging 
in treaty interpretation. See Article 31 VCLT (n 203) and Gardiner Richard, Treaty Interpretation (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 186–187. For arbitral decisions see Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia (n 173) 
para 241; Standard Chartered Bank v. The United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/12, Award 
(2 November 2012) para 270. 
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IIAs to address issues that worry them.391 With regard to treaty shopping, the most important 
provision for States to renegotiate is the definition of investor.  
There are new specific "anti-treaty shopping" criteria that States can use in their IIAs. 
Namely, the requirements of seat,392 substantial business activities and foreign control393. 
The first two criteria ensure that the foreign investor has a meaningful link to its purported 
home State and consequently thwart treaty shopping by pure mailbox companies. The seat 
requirement may be further enhanced by adding that in case of doubt, the burden to prove 
true centre of administration lies on the investor.  As for substantial business activities, the 
term can prove to be quite ambiguous. Therefore, a State wishing to make its IIAs as "treaty 
shopping-proof" as possible would be advised to include clarification of the indicators for 
finding business activity to be substantial.394 With respect to the notion of foreign control, it 
mainly protects States from claims brought by their own nationals. It is recommended to 
specify that control means actual/effective control and whether nationalities of the initial 
layers of control will suffice or if the ultimate controller (usually a natural person) must be 
identified.395 The restrictive elements included in the provision essentially have similar 
effects to DOB clauses. 
Renegotiating IIAs raises its own difficulties, mostly due to the fact that it requires the 
consent of the opposing contracting State(s).396 Given that the vast majority of the IIAs are 
concluded between developed and less developed countries, which have conflicting interests 
when it comes to investments, the opposing State might have little incentive to agree to 
                                                 
391 By the end of 2007, a total of 121 BITs had been renegotiated. Germany led this development with sixteen 
renegotiated BITs, and was soon followed by China (15), Morocco (12) and Egypt (11). The experience of the 
U.S. and Canada as respondents in NAFTA investment arbitrations has lead these States to develop new Model 
BITs that clarify the scope and meaning of investment obligations. Compared to the total number of existing 
BITs, the share of renegotiated agreements is still very small – less than 5 percent. However, more countries 
are revising their BITs to reflect new concerns related to environmental and social issues, including the host 
State's right to regulate. As a result, by the end of 2013 over 1,300 BITs were open for termination or 
renegotiation. See UNCTAD 'Recent Developments' 2005 (n 39) 5; Newcombe and Paradell (n 34) 61. 
392 Also formulated as principal place of business, registered office or central administration. See more in 
Section 3.6. 
393 Similar to ICSID Article 25(2)(b) which states: “National of another Contracting State” means…any 
juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute…and 
which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting 
State for the purposes of this Convention." (emphasis added). 
394 Such clarification can be found in COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) Investment 
Agreement Article 4 (ii): "The concept of ‘substantial business activity’ requires an overall examination, on a 
case-by-case basis, of all the circumstances, including, inter alia: (a) the amount of investment brought into 
the country; (b) the number of jobs created; (c) its effect on the local community; and (d) the length of time the 
business has been in operation." See Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, 25 
May 2007. Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 250–251. 
395 Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 277. 
396 Lee John (n 6) 373. 
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changes in the terms.397 Even if the State were amenable to reformulation of IIA provisions, 
the sheer number of liberally drafted treaties in force means that acquiring consent for 
negotiation on a broad scale amounts to a burdensome and time-consuming task. Therefore 
it seems improbable that States could take control over treaty shopping on a large scale with 
this method in the near future. With regards to individual States, the Netherlands and alike, 
renegotiations could provide a quick-fix. 
5.2.3. Global Investment Treaty 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the entire investment regime is built on a world-wide 
network of BITs, which are the root and incentive of the treaty shopping phenomenon. Apart 
from few multilateral efforts, which are either limited geographically (e.g. NAFTA) or by 
sector (ECT), no truly global architecture for foreign investment has been established.398 The 
negotiation of one joint multilateral investment framework is a possible, and rather powerful, 
solution to treaty shopping. Such a global instrument, replacing at least the majority of 
currently existing (and often overlapping) IIAs, would have a significant impact on treaty 
shopping. A global treaty would, in principle, eliminate the need for individual BITs between 
two States, and therefore remarkably curtail the possibility to treaty shop.399 Furthermore, a 
multilateral solution might be the ideal answer, as it could also remove the necessity of treaty 
shopping altogether. After all, investors would not feel the urge to find better solutions if the 
playing field was level to begin with.400 
As an additional argument, a global framework could also address multiple other substantive 
concerns of States, for example with respect to human rights and protection of the 
environment.401 Such a mutual endeavour would bring general consistency and certainty to 
                                                 
397 The developed countries commonly wish to include the broadest possible protection for foreign investors, 
as they are mainly investment exporting, while developing countries are regularly occupying the respondent 
position in investment arbitration being mostly the investment receiving party. 
398 In comparison, the global trade regime is covered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). See the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (15 April 1994) 1867 UNTS. 154, 33 
I.L.M. 1144. 
399 Drabek Zdenek, 'A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the Sceptics', Staff Working Paper 
ERAD-98-05 (World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics Division 1998) 5; Subedi (n 44) 
242; Lee John (n 6) 374. 
400 In this context some scholars have also introduces the idea of a permanent investment court to be established 
within such global treaty. This could potentially improve the consistency of the jurisprudence and satisfy at 
least some of the legitimacy concerns with regard to the current investment regime. See. UNCTAD, 'Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, A sequel' in UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
II (United Nations Publication 2014) 194–195 and van Harten Gus, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public 
Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 180–184. 
401 See Schreuer 'Nationality Planning' (n 162) 17. For more arguments in favour of the conclusion of a global 
investment treaty see e.g. Simic Sandra, 'Our Future is in the Eye of the Beholder – An Initiative for a Global 
Investment Treaty' [2016] 7 Croatian Academy of Legal Sciences Yearbook, 374–388. 
81 
 
protection of foreign investors compared to addressing problematic issues through arbitral 
tribunals.  However, the road to such a global effort is likely to be long and burdensome. For 
the time being, the negotiation of a global treaty on foreign investment law is not on the 
agenda of any international organisation and some commentators predict that there will not 
be any such efforts in the foreseeable future either.402 Attempts to draft a wide-ranging 
multilateral investment treaty have been made few times but they have failed for a variety 
of reasons. These include the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
initiative under the auspices of the OECD (1995–1998), and later the efforts within the WTO 
in include investment issues on the Organization's mandate (Doha Round 2004), both of 
which failed.403 The latest example of an international initiative to reach large-scale 
consensus on investment matters is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) agreement between the European Union and the United States, the negotiations for 
which were called to a halt in 2016.404 
At the moment, prospects for the success of such a multilateral project are slim. Even if 
States achieved an agreement on the textual content, universal (or near universal) acceptance 
is extremely unlikely.405 Despite having mutual wishes to reform IIAs, State proposals to 
improve the system represent a vast variety of approaches, which makes it difficult to 
imagine a consensus on single set of global investment protection rules.406 That is simply 
because States have different interests.407 To be precise, the level of investment protection 
that States are willing to offer for foreign investors varies significantly depending on whether 
the State is developed or developing and also whether is its capital-exporting or capital-
                                                 
402 Schreuer 'Nationality Planning' (n 162) 27; Subedi (n 44) 242 and Baumgartner, 'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 
240. 
403 See OECD Draft for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 22 April 1998 and WTO, Decision of 
the General Council of 1 August 2004 on the Doha Agenda Work Program, section 1(g). For deeper analysis 
of the reasons behind the failures see Salacuse Jeswald, 'Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The 
Search for a Grand Bargain' in Horn Norbert and Kröll Stefan (eds), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: 
Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law International 2004) 50–88. 
404 See e.g. Louet Sophie, Blenkinsop Philip, 'EU-US trade deal in doubt as France urges end to talks' (Reuters, 
30 August 2016) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-usa-ttip-france/eu-u-s-trade-deal-in-
doubt-as-france-urges-end-to-talks-idUSKCN1150H2 (accessed 2 March 2018) 
405 Schreuer 'Nationality Planning' (n 162) 27 
406 See 'Taking Stock of IIA Reform', in IIA Issues Note No 1 (United Nations Publication 2016); Baumgartner, 
'Treaty Shopping' (n 63) 240. 
407 In addition, Professor Subedi observes that one reason for States' reluctance to bind themselves to a global 
MIT could be that BITs are an easier option. Bilateral agreements commonly have a limited or fixed lifespan 
(normally 10 or 20 years), and States can also quite easily denounce or renegotiate such treaties since the 
number of contracting parties is small. Subedi (n 44) 241.  
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importing.408 In contrast, BITs are relatively easy to establish since there are only two parties 
to please.409 Consequently, finding sufficient common ground to conclude a far-reaching 
multilateral investment treaty seems unlikely. Furthermore, as the (nearly) all-embracing 
network of BITs has taken over the investment scheme by now, it would require a complete 
overhaul of the current regime through coordinated action by a large number of States to 
make such a comprehensive construction happen.410 Therefore, as Professor Pauwelyn 
observes, it is likely that the negotiation costs of a global comprehensive treaty would 
outweigh the benefits derived from such uniform investment system.411 Overall, it may be 
said that despite the ability to remove the need for treaty shopping (along with other 
investment related issues) altogether, a global multilateral solution is a back-breaking option 
to execute and thus unrealistic.  
To sum up, States have some methods at their disposal to curb the treaty shopping 
phenomenon. The most promising option is either to use DOB clauses or negotiate stricter 
definitions to the IIAs posing the highest risk of attracting Treaty Shoppers. However, when 
planning to take action, States should always bear the bigger picture in mind as some of the 
means affect the State's investment framework on a larger scale as well.  
5.3. Investor's Shopping List – Points to Consider before Treaty Shopping 
Having introduced protective measures from State's perspective, I will now turn to investor's 
interests. Even though reorganising the legal, ownership, operational or other structures of a 
corporate entity is not (in most cases) overly challenging, shopping for more beneficial treaty 
protections is not without hurdles. Investors who plan to utilise treaty shopping possibilities 
must first ensure that the planned corporate structure fulfils all of the treaty requirements.412 
In practice, the process of nationality planning is dominated by due diligence, and some 
variables should be considered before the change of nationality is carried out.413 Below, I 
                                                 
408 Comparison between the interests of capital-exporting States and capital-importing States in Salacuse 
Jeswald, 'The Emerging Global Regime for Investment,' [2010] 51(2) Harvard International Law Journal 436–
441. 
409 Skinner et al. (n 59) 263. 
410 UNCTAD, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement' (n 400) 195. 
411 Pauwelyn (n 123) 417. "Even if, in the abstract, multilateralism…could be more efficient, it is now very 
difficult for this mutation to occur: today’s benefits of a multilateral treaty must outweigh today’s cost of 
negotiating a multilateral treaty and replacing thousands of BITs...." 
412 Saldarriaga Andrea and Vohrzek–Griest Ana, Zuleta Jaramillo Eduardo, 'Treaty Planning: Current Trends 
in International Investment Disputes that Impact Foreign Investment Decisions and Treaty Drafting' In Ángel 
Fernández–Ballesteros Miguel and Arias David (eds), Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades (Wolters Kluwer 
España, La Ley, Madrid 2010) 1211. 
413 Skinner et al. (n 59) 270. 
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will lay out some crucial points that a prudent investors need to take into account before 
engaging in treaty shopping. It should be noted, however, that even if all of these aspects 
were in order, a foreign investors still has to weigh the potential benefits of being protected 
under the target IIA against the trouble and costs of restructuring process.   
a) How is 'Investor' defined? 
As described in Section 3.6., investment treaties contain different requirements for 
determining a corporate investor's nationality. If the foreign investor does not qualify under 
the IIA, all of the protections and benefits provided in it are out of the investor's reach. 
Assuming that a typical Treaty Shopper does not wish to de facto transfer its business 
activities or its seat to another State, it should opt for an IIA which has the most leniently 
defined investor requirements. Definition by reference to incorporation alone is the most 
liberal option and therefore a "golden ticket" to an investor shopping for better protections.414 
Whereas, if the IIA contains further restrictions, requiring a prospective corporate investor 
to, for example, have its principal place business within or maintain a genuine economic 
connection with the purported home State, the investor must deliberate if it is willing to 
satisfy the relevant criteria. 
b) Is there a Denial of Benefits clause? 
In Subsection 5.2.1. I explained that a DOB clause enables States to deny treaty benefits to 
a corporate investor that lacks a meaningful economic connection with the State on whose 
nationality it relies. Therefore, the goals of DOB clause are broadly similar to a restrictive 
definition of "investor" within the IIA.415 If the targeted BIT contains such a clause,416 a 
purported Treaty Shopper should be wary of it, since the risk of not qualifying for investment 
protection increases remarkably. If a Treaty Shopper is not willing to institute relevant 
business activity in the territory of the State in question, it should choose another IIA, or 
reconsider treaty shopping altogether. A potential investor should note that, the activities 
prescribed by the DOB clause should be more than the minimum business activities required 
by applicable law for a business to exist.417 On the other hand, the business activities usually 
                                                 
414 The 'incorporation alone' requirement is generally more common in 1st and 2nd generation BITs. The 3 rd 
generation BITs tend to restrict the definition of "investor" so as to preclude purported outsiders to the treaty 
from benefitting from its provisions. See Van Os and Knottnerus (n 33) 8–9; UNCTAD 'Recent Developments' 
2005 (n 39) 4–5. 
415 Skinner et al. (n 59) 271. 
416 DOB clause is normally inserted into the definition section of the treaty or included as an independent 
provision.  
417 ILA German Branch / Working Group (n 48) 64. 
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do not have to be large-scale, and the decisive factor is "the materiality not the magnitude of 
the business activity"418 What is certain is that a treaty containing a DOB clause will limit 
the use of shell companies considering that these will by definition only have the lowest 
level of economic activities. 
c) The dispute settlement mechanism 
Investor-State arbitration is the most important procedural feature in IIAs.419 The mere 
qualification as a protected investor under the IIA is cold comfort if the foreign investor has 
no mechanisms to enforce the substantive rights guaranteed in the treaty. While the 
overwhelming majority of IIAs contain at least some kind of a dispute settlement clause, not 
all are as desirable to a prospective investor, let alone Treaty Shopper.  
There are two principal mechanisms to resolve investment disputes: one for disputes 
between two contracting Parties concerning the application and interpretation of an 
applicable BIT (State-State), and another for disputes between the host country and an 
injured foreign investor (investor-State).420 The latter is predominant, at least for the time 
being, and also undoubtedly more beneficial to a Treaty Shopper as it provides an 
independent and more straightforward access route to dispute resolution, without political 
restraints. However, a Treaty Shopper should be mindful of any additional conditions 
attached to the right to commence investment arbitration proceedings. For example, a 
prerequisite of "exhaustion of local remedies"421 could lengthen the dispute resolution 
process considerably, and consequently increase investor's expenses in case of a dispute.422 
                                                 
418 AMTO v. Ukraine (n 324) para 69. 
419 Collins (n 8) 222. 
420 OECD, International Investment Perspectives 2006 (OECD Publishing 2006) 170. 
421 The exhaustion of local remedies provision requires that a foreign investor (allegedly) harmed by a State 
must first resort to the administrative and judicial system of that State, until a final decision has been rendered, 
before initiating international proceedings against the State. The purpose of such a rule is to give the State 
where the violation occurred “an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own 
domestic system…before its international responsibility can be called into question”. Cançado Trindade 
Antônio Augusto, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International 
Law (Cambridge University Press 1983) 1. However, the requiring exhaustion of local remedies might also 
carry disadvantages to the host State: public proceedings in multiple level of domestic courts are likely to 
aggravate the dispute and might affect the host State's investment climate. Schreuer Christoph, 'Calvo's 
Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration' [2004] 4(1) The Law & Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 1. 
422 Exhaustion of local remedies provision is included in, for example, the Albania-Lithuania BIT: "If such a 
dispute cannot be settled amicably within six months from the date of the written notification provided in 
paragraph 1, and an domestic judicial and administrative remedies have been exhausted, the Contracting Party 
or the investor shall be entitled to submit the dispute either to [ad hoc UNCITRAL or ICSID arbitration]." See 
Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of the Republic 
of Lithuania on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Albania-Lithuania BIT) 28 March 2007 (entered 
into force 7 December 2007). In recent years, some States such as Argentina, India, Romania, Turkey, the 
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Furthermore, a Treaty Shopper should observe whether the IIA provides for ad hoc or 
institutional arbitration. As mentioned in Section 2.3 on this Study, ICSID arbitration offers 
some distinct benefits compared to other methods of arbitration.423 ICSID's self-contained 
system covers all phases of the proceedings and, most importantly, extends to the 
enforcement and recognition of awards, providing only limited grounds to challenge an 
ICSID award.424 Consequently, it is highly probable that a final ICSID award can be 
effectively enforced, and thus an IIA with a reference to ICSID should be preferred by a 
Treaty Shopper.425  
d) Other considerations 
There are few other considerations that may affect the Treaty Shopper's decision on which 
particular investment treaty (and therefore State) to choose. One of these is the nature of the 
investment. Some IIAs include so-called "carve-outs" that exclude certain business sectors, 
such as defence, construction, pharmaceuticals, petroleum and other energy related 
sectors.426 These sectors may be subject to heavy regulation by the host State. Hence, if the 
Treaty Shopper conducts business in these specific areas, it should avoid treaties and 
jurisdictions with such pitfalls.  
Also, as established in Chapter 4, the timing of the investment should be taken into account 
before engaging extensive corporate restructuring or other treaty shopping activities. This 
will be the most relevant when an asset is distressed and a dispute has already arisen or is 
                                                 
United Arab Emirates and Uruguay, as well as few States in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and East African Community (EAC) regions, have reintroduced the mandatory requirement to exhaust 
local remedies for the settlement of investment disputes in their IIAs. This practice is aimed to empower 
domestic legal systems and other States might follow a similar path. Dietrich Brauch Martin, IISD Best 
Practices Series: Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Investment Law (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development 2017) 1. 
423 Above all, the advantage of ICSID is the investment dispute is placed under the framework of an 
international agreement, which accordingly is the only source of regulation governing all aspects of the dispute. 
ICSID forms, essentially, a self-contained system of arbitration, entirely independent of national legal systems. 
See Section 2.3 of this Study. 
424 Bernardini Piero, 'ICSID versus non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration' in Arias David and Fernández-
Ballesteros M.A. (eds), Liber Amicorum: Bernardo Cremades (Kluwer Law International 2010) paras 7, 9. In 
addition, the text of the ICSID Convention is complemented by the arbitration rules, the administrative and 
financial regulation as well as the conciliation rules adopted by the Administrative Council of the Centre under 
Article 6(1). In comparison, all other methods of arbitration provide for the conduct of arbitration under the 
rules chosen by the parties, which are further complemented by the rules of procedure of the legal system of 
the seat of arbitration. As a consequence, depending on the seat of arbitration (and therefore on the applicable 
legal system) non-ICSID arbitrations are subject to different rules and the award is subject to different means 
of recourse.  
425 In addition, the investor should verify that both Contracting States of the IIA are party to the ICSID 
Convention. 
426 Skinner et al. (n 59) 272. 
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imminent.427 However, timing may also become of relevance if the investor is planning to 
acquire an interest in an existing asset as some IIAs contain time bars to actions concerning 
investments made before the treaty entered into force.428  
Last but not least, a prudent investor should also evaluate the commercial viability of the 
treaty shopping process, that is, balance the costs and time devoted to restructuring activities 
against the additional benefits (or disadvantages) stemming from e.g. tax regulation and the 
general investment climate in the relevant territory. 
To conclude, the appropriate corporate restructuring in order to attract treaty protection can 
be very useful to a mindful investor should a dispute with the host State arise. However, the 
significant strategic advantage provided by treaty shopping requires that the restructuring is 
carried out in good time, and that the Treaty Shopper is conscious of the specific conditions 
set in the target IIA. To conclude with the words of Professor Schreuer: "A wise investor 
will structure its investment from its inception or at any rate as early as possible so as to 
benefit from treaty relations that offer maximum protection." 429 
6. CONCLUSIONS – ENEMY OR ALLY? 
The phenomenon of treaty shopping has been gaining momentum during the recent years. 
Although it is generally accepted that treaty shopping is not illegitimate per se, but rather 
sensible business practice, States seem concerned about having to extend protections of their 
IIAs to investors of third countries and/or their own nationals. Then again, in circumstances 
where an investor lacks access to a favourable IIA, it usually is recommended for it 
restructure its operations to gain maximum protection for its investment.  
The need for a clear dividing line between permissible nationality planning and abusive 
treaty shopping became apparent already a while ago, yet there is still no common consensus 
as to where to draw such line. Nevertheless, as the case analyses showed, the arbitral 
decisions have begun to set out the broad contours of the boundaries of treaty planning by 
corporate investors. Three general guidelines can be extracted. First, the case law confirms 
                                                 
427 ibid. See also Chapter 4 of this Study. 
428 See, for example, Article 10 of the Cambodia Model BIT (1998) which excludes "any dispute, claim or 
difference, which arose before [the treaty's] entry into force", in comparison to the Article 10 of the Netherlands 
Model BIT stating that "the provisions of this Agreement shall, from the date of entry into force thereof, also 
apply to investments which have been made before that date". Douglas (n 372) 340; Legum Barton, Bradfield 
Michelle, Castagno Niccolò and Gilfedder Catherine, 'Ratione Temporis or Temporal Scope' in Legum 
Barton (ed), The Investment Treaty Arbitration Review (2nd edn Law Business Research Ltd 2016) 29, 34–37. 
429 Schreuer, 'Nationality Planning' (n 162) 26. 
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the assumption that foreign investors are generally free to arrange their business affairs so 
as to gain the most favourable conditions to their investments. Second, despite this freedom, 
it is not permissible to change nationality merely to gain access to ISDS mechanisms in 
circumstances where the dispute is already extant or reasonably foreseeable. Third, when 
evaluating the permissibility, the timing and motives of the restructuring become decisive, 
but it remains unsettled how far investment tribunals can interpret the bona fide nature of 
investors' actions. Drawing the line as to whether a dispute has arisen, or whether it was 
already foreseeable, is a highly fact-specific assessment which can only be made after all of 
the circumstances of the case have been considered. Thus, the Study cannot provide absolute 
rules as to where the decisive line precisely lies. Instead, foreign investors planning to 
engage treaty shopping would be well-advised to carry out corporate restructuring in good 
time, before any signs of deteriorating relationship with the host State occur.  
Even though the guiding factors are now clearer, a grey area still exists. Multinational 
corporations are constantly engaged in anticipating legal risk and collecting tools to protect 
themselves from various business threats. Yet in the current state of legal development, it is 
not easy to conclude whether treaty shopping in order to gain treaty coverage is an effective 
and legitimate use of the law, or ineffective and abusive. Further clarification from the future 
tribunals is needed. 
This Study advocates that treaty shopping as a concept should remain permissible but only 
to the extent that it is executed in advance. If an investor engages in treaty shopping as a part 
of strategic business planning, the practice does not run counter to the underlying purpose 
of the investment regime. Whereas if the treaty shopping is done with a sole intent to sue the 
host State, the system may be misused. At the end of the day, States hold all the power in 
their hands when it comes to prospects of treaty shopping. Therefore, it is up to the States to 
protect themselves from Treaty Shoppers – if they wish to do so. States can do this best by 
using a clear and narrow definition of "investor" in their IIAs and/or including a DOB clause 
that explicitly does not require prior notice to be given to the investor.  
Time will tell how the boundaries of treaty shopping practice continue to crystallise. The 
future tribunals should strive for precision and transparency in their decisions and reasoning. 
Until then, treaty shopping is not an enemy of the investment system but an – albeit 
sometimes slightly troublesome – ally. 
